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The mutual fund industry has grown rapidly during the past decade. In the U.S., each mutual fund 
that is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is required to be overseen 
by a board of directors or board of trustees. They oversee the fund’s compliance program, negotiate 
the fees paid for the advisors and supervise the fund performance. They manage the funds on 
behalf of the shareholders and is a bridge between shareholders and fund managers. So what 
composes a good mutual fund board? Besides fund managers’ day-to-day running, could the 
composition and structure of the board impact fund performance? Using a large sample of open-
end mutual funds, and three corresponding manually-collected databases of board of directors for 
2009, 2011 and 2013, we examine whether the average board composition and diversity 
characteristics have an explanatory power of fund performance. We find that none of these tested 
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 The mutual fund industry has grown exponentially in the past decade. According to the 
Investment Companies Institute (ICI), U.S mutual funds held assets valued at over $15.26 trillion 
by June 2014. In the U.S, each mutual fund that is registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is required to be overseen by a board of directors or board of trustees. In 
general terms, the board administers the management and operations of the fund on behalf of the 
fund’s shareholders. The board oversees the fund’s compliance program, negotiates the fees paid 
for the services of the investment advisors and supervises the performance of the fund. As the 
bridge between the shareholders and the management in charge of running the fund, the board 
plays an essential role in mutual fund governance. So the following questions need to be addressed: 
What constitutes a good mutual fund board? Could the structure and composition of a board 
influence fund performance? 
 In corporate finance it is widely accepted that board composition contributes to company 
performance (see, e.g., Zahra and Pearce II, 1989; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Berghe and 
Levrau, 2004; Guest, 2009). Similarly, the mix of competencies and collective intelligence within 
a board is expected to impact an entity’s corporate governance and ultimately its performance. The 
literature finds that workforce diversity and board of director diversity helps to explain team 
performance (e.g., Murray, 1989; Williams and O’Reilly, 1998; Siciliano, 1996; Jehn, Northcraft, 
and Neale, 1999; Timmerman, 2000; Bar, Niessen, and Ruenzi, 2007; Hagendorff and Keasey, 
2012).  
 Most mutual fund studies have focused on fund managers and the impact of their characteristics 
on fund performance (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Almazan, Brown, Carlson and Chapman, 
2003; Gottesman and Morey, 2006; Fama and French, 2010; Bar, Kempf and Ruenzi, 2010; Berk 
and Binsbergen, 2012). The few studies that deal with the board composition of mutual funds 
concentrate almost exclusively on either a one-dimensional board structure analysis (e.g., unitary 
board as in Kong and Tong, 2008), director’s ownership and incentives (Chen, Goldstein and 
Jiang, 2008; Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum, 2008), board diversity (Bar, Niessen 
and Ruenzi, 2007) or on the board’s role in negotiating fund fees (e.g., Tufano and Sevick, 1997; 
Ferris and Yan, 2007). 
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 The objective of this thesis is to examine whether a link exists between the characteristics of a 
fund’s board of directors and its performance. It attempts to answer the following two questions: 
First, to what extent does the composition of a board influence fund performance? Second, what 
board characteristics are associated with better and poorer fund performance? We conduct our 
analysis along two dimensions; namely, the average characteristics of a board and the extent of its 
diversity based on all the applicable information on board members included in documents filed 
with the SEC.  
 This thesis makes two contributions to the extant literature. The first contribution is to the 
literature dealing with the determinants of fund performance. We test the link between fund 
performance and board characteristics rather than with the expertise of fund managers. The second 
contribution is that we extend the literature on board structure by jointly examining various 
dimensions of board composition within a large sample. To the best of our knowledge, we provide 
the most inclusive description of board composition for mutual funds that ranges from chairman 
independence, director compensation, board size, to board committee meeting frequency and 
various board diversity dimensions. 
Our overall conclusion is that no board composition characteristic has a robust impact on fund 
performance since we could not find a characteristic that has a consistently significant relation 
with fund or fund-family performance across various fund performance measures, time periods, 
standard error clustering methods and regression specifications. Concentrating on the sign and to 
a lesser extent on the significance of each estimated coefficient, we find that fund performance is 
positively related to board size, frequency of board committee meetings, size of board ownerships, 
length of board tenures, representations of independent directors and females on the board, and the 
number of funds overseen by boards. For a similar comparison, we find that fund performance is 
negatively related to the number of board committees, and has a mixed relationship with the 
diversity of board tenure, industrial experience and fund ownership. This can be interpreted as 
providing some weak support for the regulation change by the SEC that increased the required 
representation of independent directors on fund boards from the previous 50 to 75 percent.  Thus, 
like a previous study (i.e., Ferris and Yan, 2007, for a single cross section), we find that the relation 
between board characteristics and performance found in the corporate sector does not extend to 
mutual funds.  
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 The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses tested 
herein after reviewing the extant literature on the effect of board composition and the effect of 
group diversity on performance. Section 3 describes our sample, data collection and manipulation. 
Section 4 describes the different methods used in our regression analyses. All the empirical 
findings are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the thesis.   
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Board Characteristics and Performance 
 We begin our literature review by first concentrating on a number of board structure variables 
that are computed as an average based on all the directors on a board. 
2.1.1 Board size 
 A number of academic studies find that larger boards negatively influence corporate 
performance due to problems associated with communicating and coordinating the efforts of larger 
teams. For example, Yermack (1996) reports a negative correlation between board size and 
Tobin’s Q, and a similar negative correlation between board size and several other accounting 
measures of profitability. Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) find that board size is negatively 
correlated with ROA and operating margin for a sample of 900 small and mid-sized Finnish firms. 
Brown and Maloney (1999) report that large board size predicts lower stock price returns to 
acquiring firms. Tufano and Sevick (1997) and Gurico, Dann, and Partch (2003) report that mutual 
funds with small boards charge lower fees.  
    Other authors argue that board size can have positive effects on performance because more 
directors will provide a larger pool of expertise associated with more knowledge and skills (e.g., 
Herman, 1981). Zahra and Stanton (1988) find that large board size contributes to effective 
performance. Mahajan and Sharman (1985) conclude that small boards are related with a higher 
rate of bankruptcy. Since fund performance is likely to depend on expertise and the diversity of 
such, we expect that larger board size is related to better fund performance.  
2.1.2 Age and tenure 
    By examining the labor market for mutual fund managers, Chevalier and Ellison (1998) find 
that the MBA degree is not related to fund performance while manager age and fund size are 
negatively related to fund performance. Gottesman and Morey (2006) find that age is generally 
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negatively related to performance and becomes significant when the tenure variable is excluded. 
If tenure is a better measure of experience than age, the negative coefficient for age may largely 
capture the negative stamina effect associated with older managers (Golec, 1996). In this spirit, 
we expect that the average age (tenure) of directors will be negatively (positively) related to fund 
performance. 
2.1.3 Compensation 
 Higher compensation for directors may suggest better skills and effectiveness. However, some 
have argued that boards of directors for mutual funds fail to fulfill their monitoring and advisory 
roles according to the 1940 Act (e.g., Haslem, 2010). Mutual fund directors often receive 
significant compensation as they serve on the boards of many funds within a fund family due to 
the common clustered board structure. High board compensation can lead to entrenchment as a 
director’s main aim may become the protection of their compensation for sitting on the board 
rather than maximizing the fund’s returns for shareholders. Harford (2003) finds that the loss of 
directorship compensation leads independent directors to resist possible acquisitions that benefit 
shareholders. We expect that higher compensation, as measured by the average level of total dollar 
amount of cash compensation received by each director from the fund family for each board, to be 
negatively related to fund performance. 1  
2.1.4 Number of funds overseen 
 Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) propose a busyness hypothesis, which postulates that 
serving on multiple boards overcommits an individual, and as a consequence, such individuals 
shirk their responsibilities as directors. Motivated by this hypothesis, Ferris and Yan (2007) use a 
variable “number of funds overseen” to determine if directors that oversee multiple funds are either 
too busy to provide effective monitoring or they possess superior skills as a director. They obtain 
a positive coefficient estimate for this variable for two out of their four fund expense models, 
which provides partial evidence for director’s being on too many boards and their consequent 
inability to provide adequate monitoring.  
                                                          
1 This variable enters into our regression analysis as Ln (average compensation). Other variables converted to 
natural logarithmic values for regression analysis are director ownership, fund age and fund size, which are shown 
as Ln (average ownership), Ln (fund age) and Ln (fund size), respectively. 
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2.1.5 Committee and meeting frequency 
    As the mutual fund industry has increased rapidly in size and complexity, the time and effort 
required of mutual fund directors, especially independent directors, has grown exponentially. 
Therefore, boards often use various committees (e.g. audit, nomination, compliance, investments) 
to help manage and oversee the fund’s operations that are largely staffed by directors on the board. 
Meschke (2005) for a sample of 169 fund boards finds that lower fees are associated with smaller, 
professionally diverse boards whose committees meet more often. Ferris and Yan (2007) find no 
statistically significant relationship between committee structure and fund performance when they 
include separate dummy variables for the presence of a nominating, governance, audit, or pricing 
committee in their regressions. In our analysis, we include “number of committees” (i.e., all board 
committees) and the “average committee meeting frequency” based on the number of meetings 
each committee holds during the last fiscal year.2 We expect both of these variables to be positively 
related with fund performance.  
2.2 Diversity and performance 
2.2.1 Social category and informational diversity 
 In the literature, researchers have proposed many theories to explain the impact of diversity on 
organizational process and performance. Based on a review of over 80 studies, Williams and 
O’Reilly (1998) identify the three most common theoretical bases for investigating the effect of 
diversity on team performance as: social categorization, similarity/attraction, and informational 
diversity and decision making.  
 The logic of the social categorization theory is that variations in the demographic composition 
(like age or gender) of work groups affect their process through, for example, conflict, cohesion 
and communication, and that this process in turn affects group performance. Most of the empirical 
research on diversity and demography tend to emphasize how individuals within groups may differ 
from one another and that diversity can promote the creation of cognitive biases (e.g., Riordan and 
Shore, 1997; Tsui, Egan and O’Reilly, 1992). According to this theory, diversity has a negative 
effect on a group’s processes and performance.  
                                                          
2 A list of all committee categories in our sample is summarized in Appendix A. 
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 Similarly, the Similarity/Attraction theory asserts that similarity on attributes (e.g. attitudes, 
values, demographics) will increase attraction and liking (see, Byrne, Clore, and Worchel, 1966). 
The basic element of this theory is straightforward: individuals who are similar in background are 
more likely to share common life experiences and values.  So research based on this theory predicts 
that heterogeneity leads to decreased within-group communication which eventually negatively 
affects team performance (see, Barnlund and Harlan, 1963). 
 In contrast, the third theory (Information and decision-making theory) proposes that variation 
in group composition increases group resources through increases in skills, abilities, information 
and knowledge (see, Tziner and Eden, 1985; Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Pelled, Eisenhardt, and 
Xin, 1999). 
 Different theories often lead researchers to provide convincing but contradictory predictions of 
the effects of diversity on group performance. According to the empirical results, the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that diversity impedes group functioning and only under ideal 
conditions does diversity have the positive effects based on the information and decision theory. 
In the view of Williams and O’Reilly (1998), “diversity is a mixed blessing and requires careful 
and sustained attention to be a positive force in enhancing performance.” 
 Our study includes diversity measures for gender, age, tenure and occupation. According to the 
diversity classification from Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale (1999), these four diversity measures fall 
into two general categories: social and informational. Social diversity refers to differences among 
group members in social category membership such as age, race, gender and ethnicity. 
Informational diversity refers to differences in knowledge bases and perspectives that members 
bring to the group. In our case, such differences arise from the different tenure and past industrial 
experiences of a fund’s board membership.  Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale (1999) expect that social 
(informational) diversity is negatively (positively) related to performance, which is consistent with 
the social categorization theory and the informational and decision making theory of Williams and 
O’Reilly (1998). Based on a survey of 545 employees from one household goods company, Jehn, 
Northcraft, and Neale (1999) find a positive relation between informational diversity (education, 
functional area and position in the firm diversity) and group performance and no significant 
negative relationship between social diversity (age and gender diversity) and performance. 
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 Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas (2011) provide contrary results based on data drawn from the 
Finnish Linked Employer-Employee Data (FLEED) in Finland. Using both plant- and individual-
level models, they find that age diversity (social category diversity) is positively and educational 
diversity (informational diversity) is negatively related to total factor productivity. 
 Focusing on gender diversity, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that gender-diverse boards have 
stronger governance since female directors have better attendance records and are more likely to 
join monitoring committees than their male counterparts. However, the average effect of gender 
diversity on firm performance is negative since, on average, tough boards do not improve firm 
value. Since the value of tough boards depends on the strength of other governance mechanisms, 
increasing female quotas on boards may reduce firm value. 
 Bar, Niessen and Ruenzi (2007) investigate the impact of work group diversity on performance 
for a sample of U.S. mutual fund managers. They find that information diversity, which is 
measured by both tenure and educational diversity, positively affects fund performance. They find 
that the negative relationship between social category diversity and performance is driven by 
gender (and not age) diversity.   
 Hagendorff and Keasey (2012) examine the effect of board diversity on the performance of 
bank M&As. Applying measures of heterogeneity based on the occupational background, gender, 
tenure, and age of board members, they find that board occupational (tenure) diversity is associated 
with positive (negative) announcement returns. Unlike Bar, Niessen and Ruenzi (2007), 
Hagendorff and Keasey find that gender diversity does not lead to measurable value effects while 
age diversity is negatively associated with announcement returns.  
 Based on this literature, we hypothesize that social category diversity (i.e., gender and age 
diversity) are negatively associated with fund performance while tenure and occupational diversity 
should have a positive effect on fund performance since they give boards access to wider pools of 
resources. 
2.2.2   Board independence and other diversity 
 The 2003 scandals involving U.S. mutual fund companies raised concerns about the 
effectiveness of mutual funds boards as “watchdogs of shareholders’ interests”, a termed included 
in the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act). According to Haslem (2010): “This spotlight 
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on the reality of fund adviser practices revealed that the 1940 Act inadequately empowers 
independent directors through direct SEC regulatory oversight of fund advisers”. To rebuild 
investor’s confidence in the regulation of funds, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
on June 23, 2004 passed a new rule requiring every mutual fund board to have an independent 
chairman and raised the proportion of independent directors from the previous 50% to at least 
75%. This change has spurred fierce debate over whether such changes deemed drastic by some 
were necessary. Much of the academic research on boards of director focuses on inside, outside 
and independent directors. In the traditional corporate governance setting, Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) conclude that greater representation of outside directors on boards has a negative impact 
on firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Coles et al. (2001) also find a negative 
relationship between the proportion of independent directors and market value added. Bhagat and 
Black (1999) find that board independence, proxied by the proportion of independent directors, 
correlates negatively with firm performance as measured by stock prices.  Dalton et al. (1998) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) find no relationship between independence structure and firm 
performance. In contrast to these previous studies, Baysinger and Butler (1985) report that firms 
with a greater representation of independent directors exhibit better performance. 
 For the mutual fund industry, Kong and Tang (2008) report that unitary boards better protect 
shareholder interests and mitigate agency conflicts but that more independent boards do not lead 
to lower fees and do not carry out the fiduciary function better. Khorana, Tufano and Wedge (2005) 
report that fund (especially across-family) mergers are more likely when target funds 
underperform and their boards have a larger percentage of independent trustees. They find no 
evidence that boards with independent chairs are more responsive to shareholder interests. Using 
a sample of the 50 largest mutual fund families, Tufano and Sevick (1997) find that advisory fees 
are lower when fund boards are smaller, and comprise a larger percentage of independent directors.  
However, for a large sample of mutual fund families in 2002, Ferris and Yan (2007) find that 
neither chairman nor board independence have a significant relationship with both the probability 
of a fund scandal and fund performance. 
 Although the empirical findings are inconsistent, we are interested in examining whether the 
SEC changes fostered better mutual fund governance. Thus, we test the hypothesis that greater 
board and chair independence improve fund governance, as reflected in better fund performance.  
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 The literature also examines other board features, such as director incentives and outside 
directorships. For example, the requirement by mutual fund directors to disclose their ownership 
in the funds they oversee is relatively new.3 Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2008) find that the 
ownership of mutual fund directors is positively and significantly associated with most variables 
that are predicted to indicate greater value from monitoring by directors. Cremers, Driessen, 
Maenhout and Weinbaum (2008) find that funds in which directors have low ownership stakes 
significantly underperform, which implies that the ownership stakes of directors do play an 
important role in fund performance. Thus, we expect that the average ownership level of a board 
is positively related to fund performance.  We expect a negative relation between ownership 
diversity and fund performance since greater ownership diversity may proxy for more diversity in 
the commitment (or bonding of interest) of each board member to the fund.  
 Khorana et al. (2005) include the average number of outside directorships held by the fund’s 
independent board members in their study of the effect of board structure on the wealth effects 
associated with M&As. While sitting on other boards can give a director valuable experience, 
sitting on too many other boards may make the member too busy to carefully scrutinize various 
fund decisions. Thus, we include the “proportion of directors who have other directorships outside 
fund family” as one of our control variables and expect it to be positively related to fund 
performance based on the resource view. 
3 SAMPLE, DATA AND DATA MANIPULATION 
3.1 Fund and Fund Data Selection 
   Since we examine the impact of mutual fund boards as of year-end 2009, 2011 and 2013 on fund 
performance, we identify all open-end U.S domestic equity funds with an inception date before 
2012 from Morningstar Direct. We use this inception date because we want to study the 
relationship between board diversity and fund performance, and the literature identifies past 
performance as having an impact on subsequent performance. To obtain a reliable measure of 
                                                          
3 “In an amendment to the exemptive rules effective January 15, 2001 (Release Nos. 33 7932; 34-43786), the SEC 
requires that funds disclose each director's beneficiary ownership in each fund s/he oversees, and each director's 
aggregate ownership of all funds that s/he oversees within a fund family in the SAI and any proxy statement relating 
to the election of directors filed on or after January 31, 2002” (Chen, Itay Goldstein and Wei Jiang, 2008, p. 2635). 
Also, see: See, "Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies," SEC Release Nos. 33-7932; 
34-43786; 1C-24816; File No. 57-23-99. 
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performance, each retained fund needs to have at least 24 months of return and NAV data (12 
months for calculating current performance and 12 months for past performance). From the 38 
different objective categories contained in Morningstar Direct based on a fund’s prospectus 
objective, we only retain equity funds whose objective categories are: Aggressive Growth, Growth, 
and Growth and Income. Thus, we exclude index, bond, specialty, international money market and 
asset allocation funds.  
3.2 Collection of Board Characteristics 
 Since the end of 2002, the SEC requires all mutual funds to submit a Statement of Additional 
Information (SAI). This document, which is supplementary to a mutual fund’s prospectus, contains 
disclosures such as the fund’s financial statements, its history, policies, officers, performance 
measures, directors and persons who control the fund. To create a new database of board 
characteristics based on a sample of funds collected from Morningstar Direct, we manually search 
for each fund through the “Edgar mutual fund Search Tool” on the SEC official website. Because 
the data needs to be hand-collected and mutual fund boards are relatively stable in terms of member 
composition, we collect board information every other year. Specifically, we collect board 
characteristics data at the end of year 2009, 2011 and 2013, for all actively managed U.S. domestic 
equity funds for each of those years. 
 Specific board information collected from SAI 485APOS and 485BPOS filings for each board 
member include member’s name, birth year, gender, whether a chairperson or not, whether 
independent or not, whether has directorship outside the fund family or not, the length of time 
served on the board, the number of portfolios in the fund complex overseen by the director, the 
aggregate dollar range ownership of equity securities in the fund complex, the total dollar amount 
of compensation received by the  director from the fund complex, and past five years occupational 
experience.  Also collected are the number of different committees each board has, and meeting 
frequency of each board committee. 
3.3 Matching the Fund Sample with the Sample of Fund Board Characteristics 
 The funds in the two samples could not be matched automatically. Morningstar Direct uses Sec 
ID to identify different share classes and all share classes of the same fund are linked together by 
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Fund ID while the SEC database correspondingly uses Series Number and Central Index Key 
(CIK). We searched the Edgar database using the name of each fund in our Morningstar Direct 
sample.  For searches that resulted in no or several different funds, we compared the funds using 
other information like ticker, firm address or inception date to link each fund from the two 
databases. 
 Our final matched sample for 2009 includes a total of 4320 fund-share-class observations with 
adequate performance information from Morningstar Direct and available board information from 
the Edgar database. This 2009 sample consists of 1396 different funds for which 47 are Aggressive 
Growth, 1087 are Growth, and 262 are Growth and Income. Sample for 2011 includes 4143 fund-
share-class observations with 1268 different funds, which include 42 Aggressive Growth funds, 
999 Growth funds and 227 Growth and Income funds. The sample for 2013 includes 3799 fund 
share classes with 1130 different funds. It consists of 34 Aggressive Growth funds, 893 Growth 
funds and 203 Growth and Income funds. See Table 1 for a detailed fund family distribution.  
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Variable Construction and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.1 Board diversity measures 
 Various ways of categorizing different types of diversity are proposed in the literature. One 
common distinction is between diversity on observable or readily detectable attributes such as 
race, age, or gender, and diversity related to less visible and underlying attributes such as 
education, functional background, organizational tenure, and personality characteristics (Milliken 
and Martins, 1996). As discussed previously, the diversity categories used by Jehn, Northcraft, 
and Neale (1999) are social, value, and informational diversity.  Based on these categories and 
data availability for our sample, we use six diversity categories; namely: age, gender, 
independence, tenure, industry experience, and ownership. Data on each director’s race and 
ethnicity was not included since such information was not available. 
 Age diversity is measured by the coefficient of variation of the ages of its board members (as 
in, e.g., Michaela, Alexandra, and Stefan, 2007; Jehn, Northcraft, and Neale, 1999; Pelled, 
Eisenhardt, and Xin, 1999). Two measures are used to measure gender diversity. The first is the 
percent of female directors on each board, calculated as the number of female directors divided by 
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the total number of directors on that board. The second is Blau’s diversity index which accounts 
both for the number of different categories (variety) and the evenness or balance of the distribution 
of board members among them (Stirling, 1998; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2007). Blau’s 
diversity index is given by: 





where 𝑃𝑖  is the percentage of board members in each category, and n is the total number of board 
members. The value of this diversity measure ranges from 0 to a maximum of 0.5 when the board 
consists of an equal number of male and female directors. Also as a two-category variable, 
“independence diversity” is measured by the percent of independent directors on each board and 
by Blau’s diversity index. The Coefficient of variation (CV) of board tenure among directors is 
used to measure tenure diversity (e.g., Michaela, Alexandra and Stefan, 2007; Kosnik, 1990). 
 Our measure of informational diversity captures diversity both in tenure and industry 
experience. Our measure of industry experience diversity is based on 25 different industrial 
categories4 that are constructed from the various common general categories used by previous 
studies (e.g., Siciliano, 1996; Murray, 1989; Gibbs and Martin, 1962) and a more refined set of 
categories that are specific to the financial industry. Since initial observation revealed that most 
fund directors had experience only in the financial industry, we subdivided the commonly used 
“financial/business” category into 14 sub-classifications. As in Gibbs and Martin (1962), we use 
the following relatively new diversity measure to quantify the heterogeneity in industry experience 





where X is the number of persons in each of the 25 industry categories. This measure is 0.0000 
when all board members are concentrated in the same industry, and 0.96 when the board members 
are evenly distributed though all 26 industries. Since Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum 
(2008) and Meschke (2005) find that the ownership stakes of directors play an economically 
important and statistically significant role in determining fund performance, we also use this 
                                                          
4 Complete listing of the 26 industries is reported in Appendix A. 
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measure for ownership diversity based on the dollar ranges of director’s ownership disclosed in 
the SAI.5   
4.1.2 Other board characteristics  
 Other board characteristics may also affect fund performance. Vafeas (1999) finds poor 
performance is inversely related to the frequency of board meetings. Simons, Pelled, and Smith 
(1999) argue that team or board size can influence decision making and group outcomes. 
 Therefore, besides our diversity measures that capture the distribution and diversification of 
certain board attributes, we also add variables that describe the average level of each team’s 
characteristics, such as team size, average age, average tenure, number of funds overseen, number 
of independent directors, percent of members who have other directorship outside the fund 
complex, average level of total dollar ownership, average committee meeting frequency, and 
chairman independency (see Panel A in Table 2 for a complete listing). The dollar ownership of 
each director-fund pairing is calculated using the midpoints of the reported interval discussed 
previously (e.g., Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2008) assuming that the upper bound of the range for 
reports “above $100,000” is $150,000.  We also use the number of different committees each board 
has and average number of meetings held by the committees for each board during the last fiscal 
year. 
4.1.3 Fund characteristics  
 Our set of control variables includes the total net assets value (TNA), fund expense ratio, 
turnover ratio, fund age and previous fund performance. Many mutual funds have multiple share 
classes and Morningstar Direct lists each share class as a separate fund (identified by Sec ID). 
However, since each class only differs in their fees and expenses, we aggregate the different share 
classes into a single fund (identified by the same Fund ID). Specifically, we sum the total NAV 
(at the beginning of each month) of each share class to get the total NAV for the fund. The annual 
expense ratio for the fund is calculated as the weighted average of the MER for each fund using 
weights based on the TNA at the beginning of each month of each share class. Since every share 
class is a claim on the same underlying portfolio of investments, the turnover ratios at the fund and 
share class levels are the same. 
                                                          
5 The five ranges are: None, $1-$10,000, $10,001-$50,000, $50,001-$100,000, and Over $100,000. 
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4.1.4 Variable summary statistics 
 Panel B in Table 2 presents summary statistics for all variables included in our study. For all 
three yearly board samples, we observe that an average board is composed of 8 directors/trustees 
with a mean age of about 65 years old and board experience of approximately 10.7 years to 13.2 
years. The annual average total fund-family compensation paid to board directors is about 124,000 
USD (137,000 USD, 156,000 USD) for our 2009 (2011, 2013) board sample.6 The average 
ownership of shares in the fund family by board members is about 98,000 USD (93,400 USD, 
95,000 USD) for our 2009 (2011, 2013) board sample.7 The average number of funds overseen by 
a board member is approximately 62 (67 and 70) for our 2009 (2011, 2013) board sample. On 
average, each board has approximately four different committees and each committee holds five 
meetings during a year. For all three annual board samples, the average percentage of independent 
directors on each board is 82%, and approximately 65% of the boards have an independent 
chairman.  
 As for fund characteristics, funds in all three samples have an average age of about 20 years. 
However, the average fund size increases from about 1044 million in 2009 to about 2077 million 
in 2013. The mean turnover ratio in 2009 (2011, 2013) is 92.83% (72.79%, 65.11%) with a 
standard deviation of 99.84% (75.21%, 73.25%). Correspondingly, expense ratios are distributed 
with a mean of 1.44% (1.19%, 1.14%) and a standard deviation of 2.21% (0.61%, 0.62%) in 2009 
(2011, 2013). The large variation in fund characteristics like fund age, fund size (TNA), fund 
expense and turnover ratios suggest that they need to be controlled for when investigating the 
impact of board composition on fund performance.  
    We then examine for possible multicollinearity among our 23 potential explanatory variables to 
identify situations where they should not be included together in the same regression.8 We 
calculate the Pearson correlations for each sample (Table 3) and as expected, the two measures of 
gender (independence) diversity are highly correlated (exceeding 0.9). Therefore, we do separate 
regressions for each fund performance measure, with one using percentage and the other using 
                                                          
6 The average compensation for an independent director on a per-fund basis is $5731.08 in 2009, $6767.26 in 2011 
and $8293.44 in 2013. Interested directors generally receive no compensation from being on a fund board. 
7 Based on the range mid-spreads, the average dollar ownership of an independent director on a per-fund basis is 
roughly $12,898.27 in 2009, $15,320.01 in 2011 and $15,370.84 in 2013. 
8 Of the 23 variables, nine capture aspects of board structure, nine measure different aspects of diversity and five 
capture different fund characteristics. 
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Blau’s index as the gender (independence) diversity measure. We also observe a high correlation 
between total fund-family compensation and funds overseen (0.76, 0.60, and 0.62 for the 2009, 
2011 and 2013 samples, respectively); and between total fund-family compensation and number 
of committees (0.68, 0.61 and 0.60 for the 2009, 2011 and 2013 samples, respectively). The total 
fund-family compensation of directors is expected to increase with workload as measured by the 
number of committees that a director sits on and to increase with the number of within-family fund 
boards on which a director sits. The generally low correlation between all the diversity measures 
means that a board diversified in one aspect may not necessarily be as diversified in another aspect. 
4.2 Measures of Fund Performance  
 To ensure that fund performance is not driven by differences in risk and/or style, we measure 
fund performance using five metrics. The first three metrics measure fund performance by the 
abnormal returns (alphas) based on the CAPM, the Fama-French 3 factor model, and the Carhart 
four-factor model.   
 The Carhart (1997) four factor model is given by: 




𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the net-of-fees return of fund i during month t; 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the one-month T-bill rate in 
month t;   𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the excess return over the risk-free rate for the CRSP value-weighted index; 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 is the difference in returns between a small and large stock portfolio; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡is the difference 
in returns between a high and low book-to-market stock portfolio in month t; and 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 is the 
moment factor. When we drop 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 [all by 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 ] in equation (1), we obtain the Fama-French 
three-factor model [CAPM]. Data for all the factors are obtained from Kenneth R. French’s 
website.9 
 The numerators of the two remaining performance metrics are the dollar- and time-weighted 
average returns (DWA and TWA returns, respectively) over the previous 12 months for the fund 
after adjusting monthly for the average return for all the funds with the same investment objective 
(as in, e.g., Khorana and Servaes, 2004; Meschke, 2005; and Ferris and Yan, 2007). To do so, we 
first find the TNA-weighted average return across all of a fund’s share classes for each month, and 




then the TNA-weighted average return across all of the funds with the same investment objective 
for each month. Second, we find the difference between these two averages for each month over 
the previous 12 months according to the frequency of the board characteristics data. Third, we 
compute the DWA and TWA of these monthly return differences over the previous 12 months for 
each fund. Fourth, we divide the TWA from the previous step by the standard deviation of the 
monthly return differences over the previous 12 months for each fund to risk adjust it. 
4.2.1 Regression methods 
    In our tests of the relation between board composition and fund performance, we use two 
different econometric specifications. 
    In the first specification, we treat each fund as a separate and independent observation using the 
first step of the cross-sectional approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973).10 The original Fama–
MacBeth method estimates a separate cross-sectional regression for each time period and then 
computes the average regression coefficient across time. In our case, given that we only have three 
separate yearly samples, we only do cross sectional regressions (the first step) for each sample.   
    The second econometric specification examines the relation between board characteristics and 
fund performances at the fund-family level. We use both the pooled OLS regression method and 
the first step of the Fama-MacBeth method based on the family prospectus objectives. This is the 
objective of the fund that has the largest TNA under the same fund family. Since both fund board 
characteristics and fund returns are at the fund level, we aggregate all variables to the fund-family 
level based on the relative proportion of TNA value that each fund represents in its fund family. 
5. FUND-LEVEL REGRESSION RESULTS 
    Our empirical investigation relates fund performance to various dimensions of board 
composition and board diversity as well as other potentially relevant drivers of fund performance. 
Specifically, we estimate: 
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7 ∙ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∙
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∙ 𝑀𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 +
                                                          
10 We use the terminology of Ferris and Yan (2007) to describe this specification. 
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𝛾3 ∙ 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4 ∙ 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾5 ∙ 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾6 ∙ 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾7 ∙
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿1 ∙ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2 ∙ 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿3 ∙ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿4 ∙
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿5 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
    In (2), 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡 denotes one of our five fund performance metrics (the excess return of fund i in 
year t based on the CAPM model (CAPM), the Fama-French Three Factor Model (FF3), the 
Carhart (1997) Four Factor Model (FF4), the risk-adjusted dollar-weighted average return (DWA), 
or the risk-adjusted time-weighted average return (TWA), respectively). 𝛽1 − 𝛽9 are the 
coefficient estimates of board average characteristics, 𝛾1 − 𝛾7 are the coefficient estimates of the 
board diversity variables, and 𝛿1 − 𝛿5 are the coefficient estimates of the control variables. 
Chairman is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the chairman of the board is independent and is 
0 otherwise. Since we use two methods to measure independence and gender diversity, 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 are measured either in simple percentages, or using Blau’s 
index (see Section 4.1.1). 
    We control for the logarithm of fund i’s age in years, 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡, the logarithm of its total net 
assets in USD, 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡, annual gross expense ratio (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡), annual turnover ratio 
(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡), and previous performance (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡−1) using the same method of 
calculation as for the dependent variable (𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑡). The simplest approach to estimate model (2) is 
to run pooled OLS regression. However, a major drawback of this method is that many fund 
families use unitary board structures where the same board oversees all funds in the same fund 
family (Ferris and Yan, 2007). As a result, the pooled regression approach may understate the 
standard errors and overstate the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates for the 
independent variables. To mitigate this problem, we use clustered standard errors. The clustering 
method is consistent with the clustering criteria of the Fama-Macbeth regression method: clustered 
by fund objective, by fund objective and fund family, or by fund family. 
 In the next and subsequent sections, we only discuss variables where at least five of the 
estimated ten coefficients (three out of five for each of the independence and gender diversity 
variables) are significant at the 10% level for each pair of sample year and S.E. clustering method. 
This allows us to assess where the coefficient estimates for any independent variable is robust to 
the choice of performance metric, sample, and method used to obtain clustered S.E. After 
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discussing the estimated coefficients for board-average characteristics that meet the number of 
significant coefficients criterion, we discuss the estimated coefficients for the board-diversity 
variables that satisfy the same criterion. We present the results for the fund-level and family-level 
regressions in sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. 
5.1    Results of Fund-level Regressions  
The numbers of significant fund-level regression results based on our larger sample are 
presented in Tables 4 through 6. They are based on the detailed results presented in Appendices 
B-I through B-III.  
The first variable that meets our minimum significance criterion is chairman independence. We 
expect an independent chairman to add value to board composition and to fund performance as 
this is required under SEC regulations. The minimum number of significant coefficients for this 
variable is found only in the 2009 sample when the S.E. are clustered by fund objectives. 
Specifically, 4 (5) out of the 10 estimated coefficients for this variable are significantly positive at 
the 5% (10%) level. However, we observe a negative estimated coefficient for this variable in 2011 
and 2013 when the S.E. are clustered by fund objectives. More specifically, the estimated 
coefficients for chairman independence are negative with 1 (4) out of the 10 significant at the 10% 
level when the dependent variable is the FF4 excess return in the 2011 sample (DWA and TWA 
in the 2013 sample).   
The average tenure of board members is positively related to fund returns according to the fund-
level regressions with S.E. clustered by fund objectives in 2009 (6 significant out of 10) and by 
fund objectives and families in 2011 (8 significant out of 10). The estimated coefficient for the 
number of funds overseen by each director in the fund complex is positive across the three S.E. 
clustering methods. When the S.E. is clustered by objectives, 5 of the 10 estimated coefficients for 
this variable are significantly positive at the 10% level in the 2009 sample, and 9 are significantly 
positive at the 10% level in the 2011 sample. A significantly positive relation is observed for 6 (8) 
out of the 10 estimated parameters for this variable in the 2011 sample when the S.E. is clustered 
by families (by both fund objectives and families).  
The positive estimated coefficients for the average level of total compensation from the fund 
family for an individual director are significant at the 1% (5%) confidence level for 4 (6) of the 
fund-level regressions with S.E. clustered by fund objectives. However, we observe that some of 
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the estimated coefficients for this variable are significant (10% level) and negative in the 2009 
sample when the S.E. are clustered by fund families and by fund objectives and families. At least 
8 of the estimated coefficients for directors’ ownership are significant at the 10% level under each 
of the three clustering choices for the 2009 sample. However, we find two negative coefficients 
significant at the 10% level for the 2011 sample when fund performance is measured by FF3.  
Counter to our expectation, the estimated coefficients for the number of different board 
committees are negative. All 10 estimated coefficients are significant at the 5% level for all S.E. 
clustering methods for the 2011 sample. Furthermore, 4 (6) out of the 10 estimated coefficients for 
this variable are significantly negative at the 5% (10%) level for S.E. clustered by fund objectives 
for the 2013 sample. In contrast, 5 (10) of the estimated coefficients for average committee meeting 
frequency are positive at the 10% level based on S.E. clustered by fund families for the 2009 
(2011) sample. Furthermore, 6 out of 10 estimated coefficients for this variable are significant at 
the 10 percent level based on S.E. clustered by fund objectives and families for the 2011 sample. 
Significant estimated coefficients (all positive) based on S.E. clustered by each of the three 
clustering methods are obtained for the percentage of independent directors for at least 4 of the 5 
performance measures for the 2011 sample. Three of the 5 coefficient estimates for this variable 
are significantly positive at the 10% level based on S.E. clustered by fund objectives for the 2013 
sample. The results are somewhat better for Blau’s independent director index where 5 (3) of the 
estimated coefficients are significant (and positive) at the 0.10 level based on S.E. clustered by 
fund objectives (fund objectives and families) for the 2009 sample, 5 (5) of the estimated 
coefficients are significant (and positive) at the 0.10 level based on S.E. clustered by fund families 
(fund objectives and families) for the 2011 sample. Three of the five estimated coefficients for 
Blau’s gender diversity index are significant (and positive) based on S.E clustered by fund 
objectives and by fund objectives and families, and only for the 2009 sample. 
Nine of the ten estimated coefficients for directorships outside fund family are significant (and 
positive) based on S.E. clustered by fund objectives for the 2013 sample. Contrary to our 
hypothesis according to the social category diversity theory, we find consistently positive 
coefficient estimates for age diversity. Significance is found for 9 (7) of these coefficient estimates 
for S.E. clustered by fund objectives (fund objectives and fund families) for the 2011 sample. 
Significance is found for 6 of the estimated coefficients for each of the three types of clustered 
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S.E. for board tenure diversity for the 2013 sample. Significance is found for 5 of the estimated 
coefficients for S.E. clustered by fund objectives and fund families for occupational diversity for 
the 2013 sample. While five of the estimated coefficients for ownership diversity are significant 
and negative based on S.E. clustered by fund family for the 2009 sample, at least 6 estimated 
coefficients for this variable are significant and negative based on the three types of S.E. clustering 
for the 2011 sample and none of the estimated coefficients for this variable are significant for the 
2013 sample.  
In summary, no board composition characteristic appears to be a consistent and significant 
driver of relative fund performance in the cross section.  
6. FAMILY-LEVEL REGRESSION RESULTS 
In this section of the thesis, our individual observations are at the family and not fund level. 
Thus, our standard errors used for significance testing are clustered by fund objectives. The 
numbers of significant fund-family-level regression results based on our larger sample are 
presented in Table 7. They are based on the detailed results presented in Appendix C. Our 
discussion strategy is based on the one used in the previous section of the thesis and it compares 
the results in this section with the fund-level results based on S.E. clustered by fund objectives and 
fund families presented in the previous section.  
In general, we find that more variables now meet our minimum significance criterion for the 
2009 sample and less for the 2011 and 2013 samples. Variables that now meet the criterion for the 
minimum number of significant coefficients include board tenure, number of funds overseen, 
number of committee meetings and occupational diversity for the 2009 sample, and other 
directorships for the 2013 sample. Variables that no longer meet this criterion include number of 
board committees and board ownership diversity for the 2011 sample and tenure and occupational 
diversity for the 2013 sample. Variables that continue to meet this criterion include board 
ownership for the 2009 sample; and tenure, number of funds overseen, number of board committee 




7. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
    Since performance alphas estimated using only 12 monthly observations in the FF3 and FF4 
models are likely to be subject to considerable estimation error, we replicate all the regressions in 
sections 5 and 6 with a relatively smaller sample where each included fund share is required to 
have at least 48 months of consecutive return and NAV data. Therefore, all current and past 
performance measures for these new regressions are estimated with 24 monthly returns. The 2009 
(2011, 2013) sample used for these regressions consists of 1266 (1189, 1089) funds belonging to 
294 (308, 299) fund families.11  
The numbers of significant fund-level regression results based on this smaller sample are 
presented in Tables 8 through 10 for the fund-level regressions based on the three types of clustered 
S.E. and in Table 11 for the family-level regressions based on S.E. clustered by fund objectives. 
They are based on the detailed results presented in Appendices D-I through D-III for the fund-
level regressions and Appendix E for the fund-family-level regressions. We also run the pooled 
OLS regressions at the fund-family level without clustering the standard errors as additional 
robustness tests for both the larger and the smaller sample. The significant results summaries are 
reported in Table 12 and Table 13 for the larger and smaller sample, respectively, which are based 
on the full results presented in Appendix F and G, respectively.  
While individual coefficient estimates change, our overall conclusion remains unchanged when 
we conduct fund- and family-fund-level regressions using a two instead of one year period to 
measure both current and past fund performance. Specifically, no board composition characteristic 
examined herein is a consistent and significant determinant of relative fund- or fund-family-level 
performance in the cross section.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
    In this study, we investigate whether board composition has power to explain cross-sectional 
performance at the fund or fund-family level. Based on three hand-collected databases of board 
                                                          




information at the end of years 2009, 2011 and 2013, we test the relationship between fund 
performance measured using five metrics and board composition characteristics captured by 
eighteen variables, and five control variables to capture fund-specific features. Moreover, our 
cross-sectional regression analysis is classified into two different levels, fund level and family 
level. Our results are based on cross-sectional regressions where the standard errors are clustered 
by fund objectives, fund families or both for the fund-level regressions and by fund objectives for 
the fund-family-level regressions.  
    Our overall finding is that none of the tested determinants was a consistently significant 
determinant of relative cross-sectional performance. The results varied depending upon the metric 
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Table 1. Distribution of fund families by investment objectives 
Panel A reports the distribution by investment objectives of the large sample in which each fund share class is required 
to have at least 12-month consecutive returns and NAVs. The three prospectus objectives examined are Aggressive 
Growth (AG), Growth (G), and Growth and Income (GI). The first column “Funds/Family” reports how many funds 
under each fund family are included in our sample. The second column “# in Family” reports the number of different 
fund families that have the corresponding number of funds included in the sample. For instance, the second row 
starting with 1 in the 2009 sample indicates that there are 135 different fund families with only one fund each. Among 
these 135 fund families, 4 are Aggressive Growth funds, 109 are Growth funds, and 21 are Growth and Income funds. 
The total count of each column is presented in the first row starting with “Sum”. Panel B reports a similar type of 
distribution for the smaller sample in which each fund share class is required to have at least 24-month consecutive 
returns and NAVs. The smaller samples are used for our robustness tests. 
Panel A:  Large Sample 












Family AG G GI 
Sum 329 9 251 68 Sum 323 7 250 66 Sum 304 7 236 61 
1 135 4 109 21 1 137 4 110 23 1 138 4 111 23 
2 60 1 47 12 2 56 0 44 12 2 44 0 35 9 
3 28 1 23 4 3 31 0 28 3 3 30 1 26 3 
4 25 2 19 4 4 21 2 15 4 4 22 1 17 4 
5 10 0 9 1 5 10 0 9 1 5 9 0 8 1 
6 12 0 7 5 6 13 0 8 5 6 13 0 7 6 
7 11 0 8 3 7 9 0 7 2 7 14 0 10 4 
8 6 0 3 3 8 9 0 5 4 8 5 0 3 2 
9 6 0 3 3 9 6 0 4 2 9 4 0 3 1 
10 5 0 5 0 10 4 0 2 2 10 1 0 1 0 
11 5 0 1 4 11 6 0 3 3 11 3 0 0 3 
12 6 0 4 2 12 4 0 3 1 12 4 0 3 1 
13 2 0 1 1 13 1 0 1 0 13 3 0 1 2 
14 1 0 1 0 15 2 0 1 1 15 1 0 1 0 
15 2 0 1 1 16 2 0 1 1 16 2 0 2 0 
18 3 0 2 1 17 1 0 1 0 17 1 0 1 0 
19 1 0 0 1 18 1 0 1 0 19 4 0 3 1 
21 1 0 1 0 19 1 0 0 1 20 2 0 2 0 
22 1 0 1 0 21 2 0 2 0 21 2 0 1 1 
24 1 0 1 0 22 1 0 1 0 32 1 1 0 0 
25 1 0 1 0 23 2 0 2 0 45 1 0 1 0 
27 1 0 1 0 24 1 0 1 0      
30 1 0 1 0 25 1 0 0 1      
31 1 0 0 1 32 1 1 0 0      
33 1 0 0 1 51 1 0 1 0      
34 1 1 0 0            
36 1 0 1 0            
53 1 0 1 0                     
29 
 
Table 1. Cont’d 
Panel B: Smaller sample for a test of robustness 












Family AG G GI 
Sum 294 8 221 65 Sum 308 8 238 62 Sum 299 7 232 60 
1 119 4 94 21 1 137 5 108 24 1 137 4 109 24 
2 51 0 40 11 2 45 / 37 8 2 45 / 36 9 
3 26 1 22 3 3 32 1 28 3 3 30 1 26 3 
4 20 2 15 3 4 20 1 15 4 4 20 1 15 4 
5 8 / 7 1 5 11 / 9 2 5 10 / 8 2 
6 15 / 10 5 6 13 / 8 5 6 12 / 7 5 
7 11 / 7 4 7 10 / 7 3 7 12 / 10 2 
8 4 / 2 2 8 7 / 3 4 8 4 / 2 2 
9 8 / 6 2 9 5 / 5 / 9 4 / 3 1 
10 5 / 3 2 10 2 / 1 1 10 1 / 1 / 
11 3 / 0 3 11 5 / 2 3 11 3 / / 3 
12 4 / 2 2 12 5 / 4 1 12 5 / 4 1 
13 3 / 2 1 14 1 / / 1 13 2 / / 2 
15 3 / 1 2 15 2 / 1 1 15 2 / 2 / 
16 1 / 1 / 16 2 / 2 / 16 3 / 3 / 
17 1 / 1 / 17 1 / 1 / 19 4 / 2 2 
19 1 / / 1 19 1 / / 1 20 3 / 3 / 
20 1 / 1 / 20 1 / 1 / 30 1 1 / / 
21 2 / 2 / 21 2 / 2 / 45 1 / 1 / 
25 1 / 1 / 22 2 / 2 /      
27 3 / 2 1 23 1 / 1 /      
29 1 / 1 / 24 1 / / 1      
31 1 / / 1 32 1 1 / /      
33 1 1 / / 50 1 / 1 /      
48 1 / 1 /                     
30 
 
Table 2.  Variable definitions and summary statistics 
Panel A lists the definitions of all variables used in the regression analyses. Blau’s diversity index is measured as 1 −
∑ 𝑃𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where 𝑃𝑖  is the percentage of board members in each category, and n is the total number of board members. 
Panel B presents the summary statistics (mean, median, and standard deviation) for all these variables for 1396, 1268 
and 1130 funds in the 2009, 2011 and 2013 samples, respectively.  
Panel A: Variable definitions 
Variable Unit Description and Data Source 
Board Structure Variables 
Board Size  Persons Number of members on each board 
Average Age Year Average age of all of the members on each board 
Average Tenure Year Average length of time served by all members on each board 
Average funds overseen # 
Average number of funds in fund complex overseen by directors on 
each board 
Ln (Average Compensation) $ 
Ln (Average compensation of directors'  total compensation received 
from fund complex), based on Total compensation of each member 
on a board from the fund complex ÷ Number of members on that 
board) 
Ln (Average Ownership) $ 
 Ln (Average dollar amount of mutual fund shares owned by all 
directors on board). The dollar amount ownership  is calculated by 
setting an individual director's total ownership in fund family as the 
midpoint of the reported interval, or as $125,000 for the top interval 
of > $100,000 
% with other directorships % 
Percent of directors who have other directorships outside the fund 
family on each board 
# of Committees # Number of different committees each board has 
Committee meeting Frequency # Average number of committee meetings during last fiscal year 
Independence of Chairman Dummy 
Dummy variable =1 if the chairperson is independent, =0 if the 
chairperson is interested 
Board Diversity Variables 
% independent % Percent of independent directors on a board 
Independent diversity (Blau's 
index) 
0-1 Blau's diversity index  
Gender (%) % Percent of female directors on board 
Gender Diversity 
(Blau's index) 
0-1 Blau's diversity index  
Age Diversity 0-1 Coefficient of Variation = standard deviation/average 
Tenure Diversity 0-1 Coefficient of Variation = standard deviation/average 
Industrial Diversity 0-0.96 Using 1-[∑X2 / (∑X)2] 




Table 2, Panel A. Cont’d 
Variable Unit Description and Data Source 
Fund-related Variables 
Ln (Fund Size) $ 
Ln (sum of total assets value under management of each share class in 
millions of dollars) 
Ln (Fund Age) Year 
Length of time until now since the inception date of the oldest share 
class of a fund 
Expense Ratio % 
Weighted average of annual report gross expense ratios of all share 
classes of a fund  
Turnover Ratio 100% 
Annual portfolio turnover, a measure of the fund's trading activity, 
computed by taking the lesser of purchases or sales and dividing by 
average monthly net assets 
CAPM % Annualized regression intercept of CAPM 
FF3 % Annualized regression intercept of Fama-French three-factor model 
FF4 % Annualized regression intercept of Fama-French four-factor model 
DWA % 
Value-weighted average of monthly adjusted return differences 
between fund returns and the average return of all funds under the 
same investment objective, divided by the cross-sectional standard 
deviations of these return differences 
TWA % 
Time-weighted average of monthly adjusted return differences 
between fund returns and the average return of all funds under the 
same investment objective, divided by the cross-sectional standard 
deviations of these return differences 
Previous Performance     % 





Table 2. Cont’d 
 Panel B: Summary Statistics 
 Sample 2009 Sample 2011 Sample 2013 
Board Structure Mean Median Std Dev. Mean Median Std Dev. Mean Median Std Dev. 
Board Size  8.06 8 2.80 8.23 8 2.98 8.25 8.00 2.85 
Average Age 65.12 65.18 0.48 65.11 65.25 4.51 64.92 65.25 4.38 
Average Tenure 13.24 12.62 4.08 11.87 11.00 4.25 10.69 9.33 4.63 
Ave. Funds 
Overseen 
61.75 46.2 59.92 67.05 48.00 65.16 70.15 54.00 63.57 
Ave. Compensation 123,952 122,205 92,428 137,023 138,437 100,718 155,764 152,862 109,324 
Ave. Ownership -$ 98,632  103,333  41,370 93,404 109,375 36,502 95,009 110,714 35,936 
Ave. % other 
directorships 
0.48 0.45 0.31 0.52 0.50 0.30 0.53 0.50 0.29 
# of Committees 3.69 3 1.81 3.76 3 1.87 3.87 4.00 1.88 
Ave. Cmtee Meeting 4.65 3.67 6.99 4.35 3.6 5.33 4.40 3.50 5.39 
% Indep. Chairman 0.65 - - 0.64 - - 0.65 - - 
Board Diversity           
Indep. Director % 0.82 0.82 0.11 0.82 0.81 0.00 0.82 0.80 0.10 
Indep. Diver. (Blau) 0.28 0.30 0.13 0.28 0.31 0.12 0.27 0.32 0.13 
Female Director % 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.17 0.13 
Gender Diver. 
(Blau) 
0.23 0.24 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.28 0.16 
Age Diver. (CV) 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.04 
Tenure Diver.(CV) 0.42 0.44 0.19 0.49 0.48 0.22 0.60 0.59 0.29 
Occupational Diver. 0.87 0.89 0.05 0.88 0.89 0.05 0.87 0.88 0.05 
Ownership Diver. 0.33 0.35 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.24 
Fund-related           
Fund Size-$millions 1,044.20 137.52 5,512.33 1,969.62 352.76 8,329.34 2,700.79 477.43 11,384.95 
Fund Age-years 20.38 16.86 12.87 20.54 16.99 12.64 20.75 17.03 13.13 
Expense - % 1.44 1.25 2.21 1.19 1.16 0.61 1.14 1.11 0.62 
Turnover - % 92.83 66.84 99.84 72.79 55.00 75.21 65.11 48.00 73.25 
CAPM alpha - % 0.36 0.31 0.75 -0.22 -0.18 0.46 -0.04 -0.08 0.45 
3-Factor Alpha - % 0.30 0.25 0.66 -0.22 -0.19 0.48 -0.15 -0.13 0.50 
4-Factor Alpha - % 0.17 0.15 0.57 -0.23 -0.17 0.56 -0.18 -0.15 0.50 
DWA - % -0.11 -0.12 0.35 0.02 0.03 0.33 -0.10 -0.07 0.35 





Table 3. Pearson correlation coefficients 
The tables of correlation coefficients for 2009, 2011 and 2013 are reported in turn below.   
Fund Age 1.00             Sample size for 2009 is 1396 funds. 
Board Size 0.18 1.00                    
Chairman Independence 0.00 0.04 1.00                   
Ave. Age 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00                  
Ave. Tenure 0.11 -0.12 -0.02 0.26 1.00                 
Ave. Funds overseen 0.04 0.43 -0.07 0.10 -0.28 1.00                
Ave. Compensation 0.13 0.58 0.12 0.25 -0.12 0.76 1.00               
Ave. Ownership 0.12 0.38 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.35 0.44 1.00              
Committees # 0.11 0.55 0.14 0.19 0.01 0.54 0.68 0.26 1.00             
Committee Meetings 0.01 0.11 -0.01 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.15 1.00            
Other Directorship 0.03 0.21 -0.05 0.17 -0.14 0.30 0.31 0.13 0.31 0.09 1.00           
Gender (%) 0.03 0.17 0.14 -0.12 -0.16 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.10 0.01 -0.07 1.00          
Gender Diversity (Blau) 0.04 0.23 0.15 -0.07 -0.17 0.21 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.03 -0.04 0.95 1.00         
Age CV 0.00 -0.14 -0.03 -0.31 -0.03 -0.17 -0.25 -0.11 -0.14 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.13 1.00        
Tenure CV 0.17 0.31 -0.13 0.09 0.11 0.31 0.29 0.15 0.27 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.10 1.00       
Industry Diversity 0.14 0.54 0.10 0.25 0.02 0.39 0.51 0.30 0.41 0.07 0.27 0.13 0.17 -0.16 0.29 1.00      
Ownership Diversity -0.09 -0.31 0.06 -0.10 0.03 -0.35 -0.41 -0.43 -0.29 -0.06 -0.13 -0.01 -0.04 0.17 -0.15 -0.21 1.00     
Independent (%) 0.09 0.12 0.36 0.08 -0.02 0.24 0.42 0.19 0.24 0.10 0.09 0.25 0.26 -0.22 0.04 0.22 -0.12 1.00    
Independent Diver. (Blau) -0.10 -0.12 -0.37 -0.11 -0.03 -0.22 -0.46 -0.22 -0.20 -0.10 -0.07 -0.26 -0.28 0.24 -0.03 -0.25 0.13 -0.86 1.00   
Ln (Fund Size) 0.34 0.37 -0.01 0.14 -0.02 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.26 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.13 -0.15 0.25 0.24 -0.24 0.13 -0.14 1.00  
Expense % -0.05 -0.13 -0.03 -0.09 0.03 -0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.11 -0.03 -0.10 -0.02 -0.02 0.13 -0.10 -0.15 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.33 1.00 




Table 3. Cont’d 
 
Fund Age 1.00             Sample size for 2011 is 1268 funds. 
Board Size 0.14 1.00                    
Chairman Independence 0.01 0.09 1.00                   
Ave. Age 0.11 0.20 0.08 1.00                  
Ave. Tenure 0.12 -0.28 -0.11 0.21 1.00                 
Ave. Funds overseen 0.04 0.40 -0.06 0.13 -0.38 1.00                
Ave. Compensation 0.08 0.54 0.17 0.25 -0.17 0.60 1.00               
Ave. Ownership 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.28 1.00              
Committees # 0.09 0.53 0.16 0.09 -0.19 0.61 0.50 0.18 1.00             
Committee Meetings 0.00 0.11 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.18 0.21 0.01 0.23 1.00            
Other Directorship 0.00 0.26 0.03 0.11 -0.18 0.28 0.29 -0.08 0.28 0.04 1.00           
Gender (%) 0.02 0.24 0.17 -0.13 -0.16 0.14 0.21 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.07 1.00          
Gender Diversity (Blau) 0.03 0.31 0.19 -0.10 -0.19 0.20 0.26 0.09 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.93 1.00         
Age CV 0.02 -0.13 0.03 -0.17 0.04 -0.27 -0.26 -0.03 -0.15 -0.14 -0.16 -0.08 -0.09 1.00        
Tenure CV 0.12 0.15 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.13 0.15 -0.04 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.02 1.00       
Industry Diversity 0.08 0.49 0.12 0.18 -0.15 0.40 0.47 0.18 0.42 0.13 0.27 0.24 0.26 -0.13 0.15 1.00      
Ownership Diversity -0.10 -0.43 0.09 -0.13 0.07 -0.43 -0.40 0.01 -0.36 -0.11 -0.22 0.00 -0.05 0.14 0.04 -0.27 1.00     
Independent (%) 0.05 0.20 0.40 0.20 -0.14 0.30 0.51 0.10 0.31 0.09 0.15 0.26 0.28 -0.33 0.07 0.27 -0.17 1.00    
Independent Diversity (Blau) -0.08 -0.15 -0.39 -0.16 0.12 -0.26 -0.41 -0.09 -0.28 -0.05 -0.16 -0.27 -0.28 0.33 -0.09 -0.24 0.15 -0.93 1.00   
Ln (Fund Size) 0.31 0.44 -0.01 0.12 -0.09 0.37 0.44 0.21 0.32 0.14 0.17 0.12 0.16 -0.09 0.14 0.24 -0.34 0.17 -0.16 1.00  
Expense% -0.11 -0.27 0.01 0.01 0.13 -0.26 -0.31 -0.11 -0.22 -0.09 -0.15 -0.17 -0.20 0.08 -0.23 -0.17 0.16 -0.16 0.17 -0.56 1.00 




Table 3. Cont’d 
 
Fund Age 1.00             Sample size for 2013 is 1130 funds. 
Board Size 0.10 1.00                    
Chairman Independence 0.04 0.19 1.00                   
Ave. Age 0.08 0.12 0.05 1.00                  
Ave. Tenure 0.08 -0.27 -0.14 0.23 1.00                 
Ave. Funds Overseen 0.02 0.47 -0.04 0.15 -0.33 1.00                
Ave. Compensation 0.07 0.56 0.19 0.22 -0.21 0.62 1.00               
Ave. Ownership 0.07 0.27 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.20 0.29 1.00              
Committees # 0.10 0.49 0.15 0.14 -0.15 0.60 0.51 0.19 1.00             
Committee Meetings 0.00 0.08 -0.07 0.07 -0.06 0.15 0.21 0.07 0.21 1.00            
Other Directorship 0.00 0.21 0.05 0.02 -0.17 0.25 0.28 -0.03 0.28 0.07 1.00           
Gender (%) 0.03 0.22 0.22 -0.17 -0.19 0.12 0.21 0.01 0.16 0.04 0.09 1.00          
Gender Diversity (Blau) 0.03 0.31 0.22 -0.16 -0.22 0.19 0.27 0.05 0.20 0.08 0.11 0.95 1.00         
Age CV 0.03 -0.12 0.05 -0.16 0.03 -0.25 -0.21 -0.10 -0.14 -0.10 -0.11 -0.07 -0.07 1.00        
Tenure CV 0.06 0.21 0.09 -0.09 -0.11 0.12 0.16 -0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.25 0.29 0.03 1.00       
Industry Diversity 0.01 0.44 0.05 0.13 -0.16 0.30 0.34 0.14 0.32 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.19 -0.05 0.17 1.00      
Ownership Diversity -0.08 -0.38 0.09 -0.10 0.03 -0.44 -0.38 -0.01 -0.39 -0.17 -0.29 -0.02 -0.08 0.15 -0.09 -0.27 1.00     
Independent (%) 0.01 0.28 0.39 0.13 -0.19 0.36 0.52 0.19 0.33 0.06 0.18 0.26 0.27 -0.20 0.08 0.21 -0.19 1.00    
Independent Diversity (Blau) -0.04 -0.23 -0.37 -0.09 0.16 -0.33 -0.39 -0.16 -0.31 -0.03 -0.21 -0.27 -0.27 0.18 -0.07 -0.17 0.17 -0.93 1.00   
Ln (Fund Size) 0.28 0.44 0.02 0.06 -0.10 0.40 0.48 0.21 0.36 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.19 -0.08 0.18 0.23 -0.34 0.22 -0.21 1.00  
Expense % -0.10 -0.21 0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.22 -0.27 -0.09 -0.20 -0.10 -0.10 -0.16 -0.19 0.03 -0.16 -0.15 0.21 -0.15 0.16 -0.51 1.00 




Table 4. Summarized results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund objectives 
This table reports summarized results for cross-sectional regressions at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard errors are clustered by 
fund objectives.  Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple percentages and 
then using Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. The result is ten regression estimates for all the independent variables with 
the exception of independence and gender diversity that only have five regression estimates each for each of their two measures. Coefficient estimates with 
consistently significant positive and negative signs are indicated by + and -, respectively, in the column labelled “Result sign”. Significant coefficient estimates 
with a mixture of signs are indicated by a blank cell highlighted by yellow in the same column for each cross-section. The remaining columns for each cross-
section represent the number of significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. (Detailed results corresponding to Table 4 are in Appendix B-I.) 
 




























Panel A: Average 
Board Size + + 0 2 4   0 0 0 + 0 0 4 
Chairman + + 2 4 5 - 0 0 1 - 0 1 4 
Age -  0 0 0 - 0 4 4   0 0 0 
Tenure + + 0 4 6 + 0 0 3 + 0 0 1 
Funds Overseen + + 0 1 5 + 0 4 9 + 0 1 3 
Ln (Compensation) -  0 0 0 + 4 6 6   0 0 0 
Ln (Ownership) + + 2 8 10 - 0 0 2  0 0 0 
Committees + - 0 2 2 - 0 10 10 - 0 4 6 
Committee Meeting + + 0 0 2 + 0 0 4 + 0 0 4 
Panel B: Diversity 
% Independent + + 0 0 1 + 0 0 4 + 0 3 3 
Independent (Blau) + + 0 2 5 + 0 0 2 + 3 3 3 
% Female - + 0 1 1  0 0 0 + 0 1 2 
Gender (Blau) - + 0 1 3  0 0 0 + 1 2 2 
Other Directorship + + 0 2 4  0 0 0 + 0 6 9 
Age (CV) -  0 0 0 + 0 4 9 + 0 2 2 
Tenure (CV) + + 0 0 2  0 0 0 - 2 6 6 
Occupational Diver. + - 0 0 3  0 0 0 - 0 0 3 
Ownership Diver. - - 0 0 2 + 0 0 6  0 0 0 
37 
 
Table 5. Summarized results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund families 
This table reports summarized results for cross-sectional regressions at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard errors are clustered by 
fund families.  Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple percentages and 
then Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. The result is ten regression estimates for all the independent variables with the 
exception of independence and gender diversity that only have five regression estimates each for each of their two measures. Coefficient estimates with 
consistently significant positive and negative signs are indicated by + and -, respectively, in the column labelled “Result sign”. Significant coefficient estimates 
with a mixture of signs are indicated by a blank cell highlighted by yellow in the same column for each cross-section. The remaining columns for each cross-






























Panel A: Average 
Board Size + + 0 2 2  0 0 0 + 3 4 4 
Chairman + + 0 1 3  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Age - - 0 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Tenure +  0 0 0 + 0 0 1  0 0 0 
Funds Overseen + + 0 0 1 + 0 3 6 + 0 0 4 
Ln (Compensation) - - 0 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Ln (Ownership) + + 0 6 8  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Committees +  0 0 0 - 8 10 10  0 0 0 
Committee Meeting + + 0 0 5 + 0 6 6  0 0 0 
Panel B: Diversity 
% Independent +  0 0 0 + 0 3 5  0 0 0 
Independent (Blau) + + 0 1 2 + 0 3 5 + 0 0 1 
% Female -  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Gender (Blau) - + 0 0 1  0 0 0 + 0 0 1 
Other Directorship +  0 0 0  0 0 0 + 0 0 3 
Age (CV) -  0 0 0 + 0 2 3 + 0 2 2 
Tenure (CV) +  0 0 0  0 0 0 - 1 4 6 
Occupation Diver. + - 0 0 1  0 0 0 - 0 0 2 




Table 6.  Summarized results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund objectives and fund 
families 
This table reports summarized results for cross-sectional regressions at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard errors are clustered by 
fund objectives and fund families.  Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple 
percentages and then Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. The result is ten regression estimates for all the independent 
variables with the exception of independence and gender diversity that only have five regression estimates each for each of their two measures. Coefficient 
estimates with consistently significant positive and negative signs are indicated by + and -, respectively, in the column labelled “Result sign”. Significant 
coefficient estimates with a mixture of signs are indicated by a blank cell highlighted by yellow in the same column for each cross-section. The remaining 
































Panel A: Average 
Board Size + + 0 2 3 + 0 0 2 + 2 4 4 
Chairman + + 0 1 3  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Age - - 0 0 2  0 0 0 - 0 0 2 
Tenure + + 0 0 1 + 0 0 8  0 0 0 
Funds Overseen + + 0 0 2 + 0 2 8 + 0 0 4 
Ln (Compensation) - - 0 0 2 + 0 0 1  0 0 0 
Ln (Ownership) + + 0 4 9  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Committees +  0 0 0 - 10 10 10  0 0 0 
Committee Meeting + + 0 3 4 + 2 6 6  0 0 0 
Panel B: Diversity    
% Independent +  0 0 0 + 0 3 5  0 0 0 
Independent (Blau) + + 0 1 3 + 0 4 5 + 0 0 2 
% Female -  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Gender (Blau) - + 0 0 3  0 0 0 + 0 0 2 
Other Directorship +  0 0 0  0 0 0 + 0 0 4 
Age (CV) -  0 0 0 + 0 2 7 + 0 2 2 
Tenure (CV) +  0 0 0  0 0 0 - 0 4 6 
Occupation Diver. + - 0 0 2  0 0 0 - 0 0 5 
Ownership Diver. - - 0 3 4 + 2 10 10  0 0 0 
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Table 7. Summarized results for fund-family level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund-family objectives 
This table reports results for cross-sectional regressions at the fund-family level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard errors are clustered by fund-
family objectives.  Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple percentages and 
then Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. The result is ten regression estimates for all the independent variables with the 
exception of independence and gender diversity that only have five regression estimates each for each of their two measures. Coefficient estimates with 
consistently significant positive and negative signs are indicated by + and -, respectively, in the column labelled “Result sign”. Significant coefficient estimates 
with a mixture of signs are indicated by a blank cell highlighted by yellow in the same column for each cross-section. The remaining columns for each cross-
































Panel A: Average 
Board Size + + 2 4 4 + 0 0 2  0 0 0 
Chairman +  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Age - - 0 4 4  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Tenure + + 0 2 7 + 0 0 6 + 0 4 4 
Funds Overseen + + 0 0 6 + 0 2 8  0 0 0 
Ln (Compensation) -  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Ln (Ownership) + + 5 6 10 + 0 1 2  0 0 0 
Committees +  0 0 0 - 0 2 2 + 1 4 4 
Committee Meeting +  0 4 8 + 5 7 8 + 0 4 4 
Panel B: Diversity 
% Independent +  0 0 0 + 0 3 4  0 0 0 
Independent (Blau) +  0 0 0 + 0 3 5  0 0 0 
% Female - + 0 1 1  0 0 0 + 0 2 2 
Gender (Blau) - + 0 1 1  0 0 0 + 2 2 2 
Other Directorship + + 0 1 4  0 0 0 + 1 8 10 
Age (CV) -  0 0 0 + 2 4 6 + 0 0 2 
Tenure (CV) +  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Occupation Diver. + - 0 4 5 + 0 2 2  0 0 0 
Ownership Diver. - + 1 2 2  0 0 0  - 0 2 4 
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Table 8. Summarized results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund objectives for the 
robustness test samples 
This table reports summarized results for cross-sectional regressions for the smaller samples at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard 
errors are clustered by fund objectives.  To be included in these smaller samples, each fund share class is required to have at least 48-month consecutive returns 
and NAVs. Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple percentages and then 
using Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measure. The result is ten regression estimates for all the independent variables with the 
exception of independence and gender diversity that only have five regression estimates each for each of their two measures. Coefficient estimates with 
consistently significant positive and negative signs are indicated by + and -, respectively, in the column labelled “Result sign”. Significant coefficient estimates 
with a mixture of signs are indicated by a blank cell highlighted by yellow in the same column for each cross-section. The remaining columns for each cross-
section represent the number of significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  The sample size for the robustness test sample is 1266, 1189 and 1089 
funds for years 2009, 2011 and 2013, respectively, (Detailed results corresponding to Table 8 are in Appendix D-I,) 
 
















# at 1% # at 5% 
# at 
10% 
Panel A: Average 
Board Size + + 2 7 7  0 0 0 + 5 10 10 
Chairman + + 0 1 3  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Age -  0 0 0 - 0 2 2  0 0 0 
Tenure + + 0 2 2  0 0 0 + 0 2 4 
Funds Overseen + + 0 2 5 + 0 7 10 + 0 1 2 
Ln (Compensation) -  0 0 0 + 1 6 9  0 0 0 
Ln (Ownership) + + 6 8 10  0 0 0 + 0 0 4 
Committees + - 2 5 5 - 4 6 6 - 0 6 6 
Committee Meeting +  0 0 0 + 3 9 10  0 0 0 
Panel B: Diversity 
% Independent + + 0 1 2  0 0 0 + 0 1 1 
Independent (Blau) + + 0 1 2  0 0 0 + 0 4 4 
% Female - + 1 3 4  0 0 0 + 1 1 1 
Gender (Blau) - + 1 1 5  0 0 0 + 2 4 4 
Other Directorship +  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Age (CV) -  0 0 0 + 0 0 1 + 2 3 3 
Tenure (CV) + + 0 0 2  0 0 0 - 0 6 6 
Occupational Diver. + - 0 0 1  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Ownership Diver. -  0 0 0  0 0 0 - 6 6 6 
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Table 9. Summarized results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund families for the robustness 
test samples  
This table reports summarized results for cross-sectional regressions for the smaller samples at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard 
errors are clustered by fund families.  To be included in these smaller samples, each fund share class is required to have at least 48-month consecutive returns and 
NAVs. Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple percentages and then 
Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. The result is ten regression estimates for all the independent variables with the 
exception of independence and gender diversity that only have five regression estimates each for each of their two measures. Coefficient estimates with 
consistently significant positive and negative signs are indicated by + and -, respectively, in the column labelled “Result sign”. Significant coefficient estimates 
with a mixture of signs are indicated by a blank cell highlighted by yellow in the same column for each cross-section. The remaining columns for each cross-
section represent the number of significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The fund-level sample size for the robustness test sample is 1266, 1189 and 






























Panel A: Average 
Board Size + + 0 3 5   0 0 0 + 5 8 10 
Chairman +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Age -   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Tenure +   0 0 0 + 0 4 9   0 0 0 
Funds Overseen + + 0 0 2 + 0 6 6   0 0 0 
Ln (Compensation) -   0 0 0 + 0 0 1   0 0 0 
Ln (Ownership) + + 0 0 2   0 0 0 + 2 2 10 
Committees +   0 0 0 - 1 3 5 - 0 1 3 
Committee Meeting +   0 0 0 + 8 10 10   0 0 0 
Panel B: Diversity 
% Independent +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Independent (Blau) +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
% Female - + 0 0 2   0 0 0 + 0 0 1 
Gender (Blau) - + 0 2 5   0 0 0 + 1 5 5 
Other Directorship +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Age (CV) -   0 0 0   0 0 0 + 0 0 2 
Tenure (CV) + + 0 0 1   0 0 0 - 2 5 5 
Occupation Diver. +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 




Table 10.  Summarized results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund objectives and fund 
families for the robustness test samples 
This table reports summarized results for cross-sectional regressions for the smaller samples at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard 
errors are clustered by fund objectives and fund families.  To be included in these smaller samples, each fund share class is required to have at least 48-month 
consecutive returns and NAVs. Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple 
percentages and then Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. The result is ten regression estimates for all the independent 
variables with the exception of independence and gender diversity that only have five regression estimates each for each of their two measures. Coefficient 
estimates with consistently significant positive and negative signs are indicated by + and -, respectively, in the column labelled “Result sign”. Significant 
coefficient estimates with a mixture of signs are indicated by a blank cell highlighted by yellow in the same column for each cross-section. The remaining 
columns for each cross-section represent the number of significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The sample size for the robustness test sample is 
1266, 1189 and 1089 funds for year 2009, 2011 and 2013, respectively. (Detailed results corresponding to Table 10 are in Appendix D-III.) 
 
Variables Pred. sign 

























Panel A: Average 
Board Size + + 1 3 4   0 0 0 + 6 10 10 
Chairman +   0 0 0   0 0 0 - 0 0 2 
Age -   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Tenure +   0 0 0 + 0 6 10   0 0 0 
Funds Overseen + + 0 0 2 + 0 5 8   0 0 0 
Ln (Compensation) -   0 0 0 + 0 0 1   0 0 0 
Ln (Ownership) + + 0 0 1   0 0 0 + 2 2 10 
Committees +   0 0 0 - 3 4 7 - 0 2 3 
Committee Meeting +   0 0 0 + 8 10 10   0 0 0 
Panel B: Diversity    
% Independent +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Independent (Blau) +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
% Female -   0 0 0   0 0 0 + 0 0 1 
Gender (Blau) - + 0 3 5   0 0 0 + 2 5 5 
Other Directorship +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Age (CV) -   0 0 0   0 0 0 + 0 0 2 
Tenure (CV) + + 0 0 2   0 0 0 - 3 5 5 
Occupation Diver. +   0 0 0   0 0 0 - 0 0 1 
Ownership Diver. - - 0 4 4   0 0 0 + 0 0 2 
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Table 11. Summarized results for fund-family level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund-family objectives 
for the robustness test sample 
 This table reports summarized results for cross-sectional regressions for the smaller samples at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the 
standard errors are clustered by fund-family objectives.  To be included in these smaller samples, each fund share class is required to have at least 48-month 
consecutive returns and NAVs.  Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple 
percentages and then Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. The result is ten regression estimates for all the independent 
variables with the exception of independence and gender diversity that only have five regression estimates each for each of their two measures. Coefficient 
estimates with consistently significant positive and negative signs are indicated by + and -, respectively, in the column labelled “Result sign”. Significant 
coefficient estimates with a mixture of signs are indicated by a blank cell highlighted by yellow in the same column for each cross-section. The remaining 
columns for each cross-section represent the number of significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The family-level sample size for the robustness test 
















#  at 
1% 
#  at  
5% 




#  at  
1% 
#  at  
5% 
#  at  
10% 
Panel A: Average 
Board Size +   0 0 0 + 0 2 4 + 4 6 8 
Chairman +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Age -   0 0 0 - 1 2 2   0 0 0 
Tenure + + 0 0 2 + 0 0 2 + 0 4 4 
Funds Overseen + + 1 2 2 + 4 8 9   0 0 0 
Ln (Compensation) -   0 0 0 + 0 0 1   0 0 0 
Ln (Ownership) + + 0 6 6   0 0 0 + 0 2 7 
Committees +   0 0 0 - 0 0 4 + 0 2 4 
Committee Meeting + + 2 2 2 + 5 8 10   0 0 0 
Panel B: Diversity 
% Independent +   0 0 0   0 0 0 + 0 1 3 
Independent (Blau) +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
% Female - + 0 0 1   0 0 0 + 0 5 5 
Gender (Blau) -   0 0 0   0 0 0 + 3 5 5 
Other Directorship +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Age (CV) - + 4 4 4   0 0 0 + 2 2 2 
Tenure (CV) + + 1 4 4   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Occupation Diver. +   0 0 0 + 0 0 4 - 0 2 2 
Ownership Diver. -   0 0 0 - 0 0 3 - 0 2 9 
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Appendix A. Industry and committee category list 
This appendix reports the industry and committee categories used in this thesis. 
Industry Category Committee Category 
Financial Service/Consultant/Analyst Audit  
Asset Management/Capital Advisory/Money Management Executive/Operations 
Closed-end Investment Company Independent Directors 
Hedge Fund Qualified Legal Compliance 
Mutual Fund/Trust (outside the fund complex) Proxy Voting 
Foundation/Institutional account/Endowment Nominating and Fund Governance 
Private-equity Fund/Venture Capital Valuation/Pricing 
Banking System/Bank-holding Company Contract/Distribution 
Real-Estate/REIT/Mortgage Investment 
Securities/Stock Exchange Performance 
Insurance/Retirement/Pension Fund Compensation 
Others with financial background 
(Broker/dealer/underwriter/private investor…) 
Brokerage 
Other business (HR Firm/Marketing…) Communications, Service and Marketing 
Accounting/Auditing Other 
Consumer Products (Retail/Wholesale)  
Legal/Law firm  






Manufacturer/Engineering/Construction/Industrial Product  
Energy/Resources Exploration/Airline  
Transportation/Delivery  





Appendix B-I. Full results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund objectives 
The tables in this appendix reports results for each cross-sectional regression at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard errors are 
clustered by fund objectives.  Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple 
percentages and then using Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. Panel A presents regression results for the sample of 1396 
funds in 2009, Panel B presents regression results for the sample of 1268 funds in 2011, and Panel C presents regression results for the sample of 1130 funds in 
2013. a, b and c refer to significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
Panel A: 2009 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size 0.0158a 0.0118 0.0186a 0.0147 0.0195b 0.0159b 0.0069 0.0057 0.0053 0.0042 
Chairman  0.051 0.0787a 0.0566b 0.0882c 0.0614b 0.0907c 0.0108 0.0214 0.0152 0.0247 
Age -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.0019 -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0034 -0.0033 
Tenure 0.0092b 0.0102b 0.0082b 0.0092b 0.0022 0.003 0.0037a 0.0039a 0.0025 0.0028 
100*Fund overseen 0.0002 0.0065 0.0729 0.0814 0.0681a 0.0762b 0.0269a 0.0306a 0.0159 0.0192a 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0156 -0.0111 -0.030 -0.025 -0.018 -0.0139 -0.0124 -0.0109 -0.0115 -0.0101 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0254b 0.0269b 0.0232b 0.0247c 0.0155b 0.0168c 0.0096a 0.01a 0.0111b 0.0115b 
# of Committees 0.0042 0.0049 0.0044 0.0048 0.0022 0.0031 -0.0052b -0.0051b -0.0047 -0.0047 
Ave. Meetings 0.0021 0.0024 0.0018 0.0021 0.0021 0.0024 0.0021a 0.0023a 0.0023 0.0024 
Board Diversity 
% Independent 0.0438  0.0275  0.1374a  0.0367  0.0058  
Independent (Blau)  0.333a  0.3722a  0.2477a  0.0946b  0.1124b 
% Female 0.1864  0.1495  0.1579b  -0.0181  -0.0167  
Gender (Blau)  0.2463a  0.1914a  0.191b  0.008  0.0138 
Other Directorship 0.1077b 0.1128b 0.0638a 0.0672a 0.0194 0.0228 0.0351 0.0362 0.0406 0.0419 
Age Diver. (CV) 0.2303 0.1162 0.0445 -0.097 -0.151 -0.2781 0.2838 0.2364 0.2616 0.2195 
Tenure Diver.(CV) 0.1264 0.1138 0.0637 0.0529 0.0943 0.0844 0.0214 0.0194 0.0346a 0.0322a 
Industry Diver. -0.5656a -0.4893 -0.542 -0.452 -0.787a -0.7167a 0.0125 0.0405 0.0333 0.0611 
Ownership Diver. -0.0914 -0.1087 -0.067 -0.084 -0.035 -0.0488 -0.0872 -0.0919 -0.0971a -0.1022a 
Control Variables 
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0294 0.0384 0.0030 0.0124 0.0369 0.0458 -0.0287 -0.0258 -0.0197 -0.0169 
Ln (Fund size) 0.0094b 0.0089b 0.0103a 0.0099a 0.0035 0.0031 0.0109a 0.0109a 0.0087a 0.0087a 
Gross Expense  0.0108 0.0109 0.0253c 0.0255c 0.0175c 0.0178c 0.003 0.0031 0.0005 0.0007 
100*Turnover -0.0024 0.0004 0.0038 0.0065 0.0139 0.0158 -0.0121a -0.0115a -0.0177b -0.0169b 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0298 0.0304         
Prev. (FF3)   -0.036 -0.035       
Prev. (FF4)     -0.038 -0.0373     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.3418c -0.3415c   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.4205c -0.4198c 
Adjusted R2 0.0200 0.0228 0.0332 0.0370 0.0387 0.0406 0.1203 0.1210 0.1645 0.1655 
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Appendix B-I. Cont’d 
Panel B:  2011 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average            
Board Size 0.0033 0.0042 0.0041 0.0048 0.0058 0.006 0.0069 0.0079 0.0069 0.0078 
Chairman  -0.0063 0.0002 -0.0173 -0.0105 -0.0221 -0.0154a -0.0161 -0.0184 -0.0194 -0.0207 
Age -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0018 0.0017 0.0018 0.0021 -0.0025b -0.0026b -0.0018b -0.0019b 
Tenure 0.007a 0.0067 0.0071a 0.0068 0.0054 0.0051 0.0042a 0.0041 0.0041 0.004 
100*Fund overseen 0.0713b 0.0704b 0.0726b 0.0714b 0.10102a 0.10079a 0.03987a 0.03821a 0.03594a 0.03438 
Ln (Compensation) 0.015a 0.0217a 0.0159c 0.0236c 0.0205c 0.0279c 0.0113 0.0139 0.0089 0.0119 
Ln (Ownership) -0.009 -0.0096 -0.0067a -0.0074a -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0045 -0.0047 -0.0028 -0.003 
# of Committees -0.0257b -0.026b -0.0422b -0.0425b -0.0502b -0.0501b -0.0229b -0.0233b -0.0219b -0.0223b 
Ave. Meetings 0.0052a 0.0053a 0.0026 0.0028 0.0002 0.0002 0.0037a 0.0038 0.0038a 0.0039 
Board Diversity           
% Independent 0.4671a  0.553a  0.543  0.276a  0.2912a  
Independent (Blau)  -0.3152  -0.3687  -0.3442  0.2461a  0.2482a 
% Female -0.0007  0.0503  -0.122  -0.0074  -0.0009  
Gender (Blau)  -0.0617  -0.011 -0.0215 -0.1076  -0.0341  -0.0293 
Other Directorship -0.0158 -0.0229 -0.0275 -0.0356 -0.122 -0.0287 0.0015 -0.0025 0.0055 0.0013 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.5687a 0.5402a 0.9008a 0.8702 0.7865b 0.7562a 0.4066b 0.4356a 0.3924b 0.415b 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0882 -0.0856 -0.0337 -0.0345 -0.0635 -0.0636 -0.0273 -0.0278 -0.0141 -0.0147 
Industry Diver. 0.0856 0.101 0.0736 0.0884 0.2825 0.2723 0.0622 0.0586 0.0626 0.0606 
Ownership Diver. 0.2028a 0.2093a 0.1776a 0.1851a 0.1717a 0.1735a 0.1066 0.1115 0.1047 0.1096 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0682b 0.0662b 0.0637b 0.0617b 0.0401a 0.0385 0.0071 0.0047 0.0023 0.0004 
Ln (Fund size) -0.0466c -0.047b -0.0552c -0.0558c -0.0515c -0.0518c -0.028b -0.0281b -0.0285b -0.0286b 
Gross Expense  -0.2158c -0.2156c -0.1957c -0.1951c -0.2142c -0.2132c -0.1253c -0.1239c -0.1295c -0.1282c 
100*Turnover -0.1073b -0.1081b -0.076c -0.0761c -0.1011c -0.1006c -0.0513b -0.0516b -0.06194b -0.06227b 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0085 0.0106         
Prev. (FF3)   0.2083b 0.2116b       
Prev. (FF4)     0.0761 0.0789     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.0539 -0.0538   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.0747 -0.0744 
Adjusted R2 0.1274 0.1262 0.1283 0.1261 0.0933 0.0919 0.0851 0.0865 0.0926 0.0935 
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Appendix B-I. Cont’d 
Panel C:  2013 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size 0.0052 0.0028 0.0051a 0.003 0.0027 0.001 0.0155a 0.0142a 0.0162a 0.0148 
Chairman  -0.009 -0.0079 -0.0004 -0.002 -0.0011 -0.0045 -0.0216b -0.019a -0.0283a -0.0263a 
Age -0.0065 -0.0056 -0.003 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0024 -0.002 
Tenure -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.003 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0023 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 0.0008a 
100*Fund overseen -0.0057 0.00159 0.0091 0.0149a 0.0119a 0.0169b -0.04652 -0.04195 -0.0508 -0.04658 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0228 0.019 0.0085 0.0031 0.0084 0.0031 0.0102 0.0085 0.011 0.0096 
Ln (Ownership) -0.008 -0.0074 -0.0088 -0.0084 -0.0097 -0.0092 -0.0057 -0.0054 -0.0044 -0.0041 
# of Committees -0.0088a -0.0086a -0.0105 -0.0104 0.0149 0.0146 -0.0054b -0.0053b -0.0055b -0.0054b 
Ave. Meeting 0.0005 0.0003 0.0013a 0.0016a 0.0013a 0.0015a 0.0014 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 
Board Diversity 
% Independent 0.1847b  0.2779b  0.2483b  0.101  0.071  
Independent (Blau)  0.2081c  0.242c  0.2071c  0.1258  0.1006 
% Female 0.0619  0.0931  0.0246  0.0433b  0.0551a  
Gender (Blau)  0.1932  0.2076  0.1535  0.1004b  0.1153c 
Other Directorship 0.0868a 0.0925a 0.1008b 0.1067b 0.0788b 0.084b 0.0446b 0.0411b 0.0364 0.0335a 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.668b 0.6774b 0.2344 0.2486 0.2665 0.2902 -0.1432 -0.1459 -0.0665 -0.0671 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0943b -0.1073b -0.123c -0.1349c -0.0844b -0.0966b -0.0023 -0.0083 -0.01 -0.0166 
Industry Diver. -0.7137 -0.7278a -0.8356a -0.8557a -0.6609 -0.6811 -0.2331 -0.2375 -0.3104 -0.3164 
Ownership Diver. -0.0171 -0.0238 0.0392 0.0334 0.0166 0.0102 -0.0202 -0.0234 -0.0212 -0.0244 
Control Variables 
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0129 0.0159 0.0163 0.0193 -0.0049 -0.0022 -0.0147 -0.0132 -0.0237 -0.0222 
Ln (Fund size) 0.0308 0.0308 0.0135 0.0136 0.0206 0.0207 -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0014 -0.0015 
Gross Expense  0.0398 0.0408 0.005 0.0058 0.0159 0.0168 0.005 0.0049 0.0149 0.015 
100*Turnover -0.0491c -0.0476c -0.0841b -0.0824b -0.0764c -0.0746c 0.03796 0.03838 0.0365 0.03702 
Prev. (CAPM) -0.2862c -0.282b         
Prev. (FF3)   -0.1713c -0.1668c       
Prev. (FF4)     -0.2648b -0.2614b     
Prev. (DWA)       0.4079b 0.4088b   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.4026b 0.403b 
Adjusted R2 0.08496 0.0888 0.0496 0.0525 0.0965 0.0981 0.1118 0.1137 0.1084 0.1104 
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Appendix B-II. Full results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund families 
The tables in this appendix reports results for each cross-sectional regression at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard errors are 
clustered by fund families.  Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple 
percentages and then Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. Panel A presents regression results for the sample of 1396 funds 
in 2009, Panel B presents regression results for the sample of 1268 funds in 2011, and Panel C presents regression results for the sample of 1130 funds in 201s. a, 
b and c refer to significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
Panel A: 2009 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size 0.0151 0.0114 0.0187 0.015 0.0203b 0.0167b 0.0072 0.006 0.0056 0.0045 
Chairman  0.0494 0.0776 0.0568 0.0888a 0.0633a 0.093b 0.0116 0.0222 0.0159 0.0255 
Age -0.0041 -0.004 -0.0036 -0.0035 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0043 -0.0042a -0.0036 -0.0035 
Tenure 0.0089 0.01 0.0083 0.0093 0.0025 0.0033 0.0038 0.004 0.0026 0.0029 
100*Funds overseen 0.0049 0.0032 0.0734 0.0831 0.0739a 0.083 0.0292 0.0332 0.0183 0.0218 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0155 -0.011 -0.0303a -0.0253 -0.0187 -0.014 -0.0125 -0.011 -0.0115 -0.0101 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0256b 0.0271b 0.0232b 0.0246b 0.0153 0.0166 0.0095a 0.0099a 0.011b 0.0114b 
# of Committees 0.0065 0.0064 0.0042 0.004 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0062 -0.0063 -0.0058 -0.0059 
Ave. Meetings 0.0021 0.0024 0.0019 0.0022 0.0022a 0.0025a 0.0022 0.0023a 0.0023a 0.0024a 
Board Diversity 
% Independent 0.0466  0.0274  0.1345  0.0355  0.0047  
Independent (Blau)  0.3296  0.3741b  0.2545a  0.0972  0.1151 
% Female 0.1742  0.1506  0.1719  -0.0125  -0.0111  
Gender (Blau)  0.2382  0.1958  0.208a  0.0144  0.0203 
Other Directorship 0.0466 0.1142 0.0637 0.0665 0.0169 0.0199 0.0341 0.0351 0.0396 0.0409 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.2492 0.1285 0.043 -0.104 -0.1731 -0.3033 0.2753 0.227 0.2532 0.2099 
Tenure Diver.(CV) 0.1211 0.1105 0.0642 0.0547 0.1003 0.0912 0.0237 0.0219 0.0369 0.0347 
Industry Diver. -0.5638 -0.4883 -0.5428 -0.4532 -0.7889a -0.7183 0.0116 0.0396 0.0324 0.0602 
Ownership Diver. -0.0956 -0.1112 -0.0674 -0.0828 -0.0305 -0.0435a -0.0852a -0.0899a -0.0952a -0.1001b 
Control Variables 
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0301 0.1285 0.0029 0.0123 -0.1731 0.045 -0.0289 -0.0261 -0.0199 -0.0172 
Ln (Fund size) 0.0093 0.1105 0.0103 0.01 0.1003 0.0032 0.011b 0.0109b 0.0088 0.0087 
Gross Expense  0.011 -0.4883 0.0253b 0.0255b -0.7889 0.0175 0.0029 0.003 0.0004 0.0005 
100*Turnover -0.0016 -0.1112 0.0038 -0.0253 -0.0305 0.0147 -0.0125 -0.0118 -0.0181 -0.0173 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0306 0.0309         
Prev. (FF3)   -0.0369 -0.0358       
Prev. (FF4)     -0.0395 -0.038     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.3417c -0.3413c   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.4203c -0.4196c 
Adjusted R2 0.0202 0.0229 0.0332 0.0370 0.0392 0.0413 0.1205 0.1212 0.1646 0.1657 
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Panel B: 2011 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average 
Board Size 0.0033 0.0042 0.0042 0.0048 0.0056 0.0059 0.0068 0.0078 0.0068 0.0077 
Chairman  -0.0062 0.0002 -0.0171 -0.0104 -0.0225 -0.0157 -0.0164 -0.0186 -0.0197 -0.021 
Age -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0017 0.0016 0.002 0.0024 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0016 -0.0017 
Tenure 0.007 0.0067 0.0072 0.0069a 0.0053 0.005 0.0041 0.0041 0.004 0.0039 
100*Funds overseen 0.072b 0.0703a 0.0747a 0.073a 0.097b 0.0964b 0.0365 0.0345 0.0323 0.0304 
Ln (Compensation) 0.015 0.0217 0.0159 0.0236 0.0204 0.0278 0.0112 0.0139 0.0088 0.0118 
Ln (Ownership) -0.0089 -0.0096 -0.0065 -0.0073 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0048 -0.005 -0.0031 -0.0033 
# of Committees -0.026b -0.026b -0.0432c -0.0432c -0.0482c -0.0479c -0.0213c -0.0215c -0.0201c -0.0203c 
Ave. Meetings 0.0052b 0.0053b 0.0026 0.0028 0.0003 0.0003 0.0037b 0.0039b 0.0039b 0.004b 
Board Diversity 
% Independent 0.4672b  0.5533b  0.5426b  0.2754a  0.2905a  
Independent (Blau)  0.3153a  0.3682b  0.3454a  0.2469b  0.2492b 
% Female 0.0012  0.0567  -0.1347  -0.0182  -0.0124  
Gender (Blau)  -0.0618  -0.006  -0.1223  -0.0464  -0.0426 
Other Directorship -0.0154 -0.0229 -0.0262 -0.0345 -0.0241 -0.0316 -0.0007 -0.005 0.0031 -0.0014 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.5674 0.5402 0.8965b 0.8669b 0.7951 0.7658 0.4138 0.4436a 0.4002 0.4237 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0874 -0.0856 -0.0311 -0.0328 -0.0687 -0.0685 -0.0317 -0.0319 -0.0188 -0.0191 
Industry Diver. 0.0824 0.1012 0.063 0.0805 0.3033 0.2953 0.08 0.0781 0.0817 0.0815 
Ownership Diver. 0.2028c 0.2093c 0.1777b 0.1852b 0.1715a 0.1731a 0.1064b 0.1112b 0.1044b 0.1093b 
Control Variables 
Ln (Fund Age) 0.5674c 0.0662b 0.0637b 0.0617a 0.0402 0.0385 0.4138 0.0047 0.0024 0.0001 
Ln (Fund size) -0.0874c -0.047c -0.0553c -0.0558c -0.0514c -0.0517c -0.0317c -0.028c -0.0284c -0.0285c 
Gross Expense  0.0824c -0.2156c -0.1961c -0.1954c -0.2134c -0.2123c 0.08c -0.1232c -0.1287c -0.1274c 
100*Turnover 0.2028c -0.1081c -0.0757c -0.0762c -0.1007c -0.1002c 0.1064c -0.0512c -0.0615c -0.0619c 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0086 0.0105         
Prev. (FF3)   0.2088c 0.2119c       
Prev. (FF4)     0.0751 0.0778     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.0546b -0.0545b   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.0755c -0.0753c 
Adjusted R2 0.1274 0.1262 0.1284 0.1262 0.0937 0.0924 0.0859 0.0875 0.0935 0.0946 
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Panel C: 2013 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size 0.0055 0.0032 0.0051 0.003 0.0027 0.001 0.0156c 0.0143b 0.0162c 0.0149c 
Chairman  -0.007 -0.0062 -0.0004 -0.0022 -0.001 -0.0045 -0.0212 -0.0188 -0.028 -0.0262 
Age -0.006 -0.0052 -0.0029 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0015 -0.0021 -0.0017 
Tenure -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.003 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0022 0.0004 0.0002 0.0006 0.0008 
100*Funds overseen -0.0145 -0.0068 0.0081 0.0146 0.0104 0.0161 0.0503a 0.0456a 0.0539a 0.0495a 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0251 0.0207 0.0088 0.0032 0.0088 0.0034 0.0113 0.0094 0.0119 0.0103 
Ln (Ownership) -0.0098 -0.0091 -0.009 -0.0085 -0.01 -0.0094 -0.0066 -0.0063 -0.0052 -0.0049 
# of Committees 0.0131 0.0126 0.0112 0.0107 0.0157 0.0151 0.0076 0.0075 0.0073 0.0071 
Ave. Meetings 0.0007 0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0015 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 
Board Diversity 
% Independent -0.2243  -0.2833  -0.2558  -0.1202  -0.0869  
Independent (Blau)  0.2303  0.2428a  0.2094  0.1356  0.1085 
% Female 0.0509  0.0923  0.023  0.0392  0.0517  
Gender (Blau)  0.178  0.207a  0.1519  0.0934  0.1096 
Other Directorship 0.0856 0.0918a 0.1001a 0.1061a 0.0782 0.0836 -0.0463 -0.0425 -0.0378 -0.0347 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.7132b 0.7201b 0.2395 0.2503 0.2742 0.2946 -0.1234 -0.127 -0.0501 -0.0517 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0992b -0.1112b -0.1236b -0.135c -0.0853a -0.097a -0.0045 -0.01 -0.0119 -0.018 
Industry Diver. -0.7421 -0.7542 -0.8362a -0.8545a -0.664 -0.6824 -0.2401 -0.2439 -0.3162 -0.3216 
Ownership Diver. -0.0058 -0.0131 0.0416 0.0348 0.0193 0.012 -0.0129 -0.0162 -0.0152 -0.0185 
Control Variables 
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0132 0.0162 0.016 0.2503 -0.0051 -0.0023 -0.0152 -0.0136 -0.0241 -0.0226 
Ln (Fund size) 0.0315c 0.0315c 0.0134 -0.135 0.0206a 0.0207a -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0014 -0.0014 
Gross Expense  0.0441 0.0446 0.0054 -0.8545 0.0166 0.0171 0.0067 0.0064 0.0163 0.0162 
100*Turnover -0.0493b -0.0478b -0.0841c 0.0348c -0.0764b -0.0746b 0.0379a 0.0383a 0.0365a 0.037a 
Prev. (CAPM) -0.2836c -0.2797c         
Prev. (FF3)   -0.1707c -0.1664c       
Prev. (FF4)     -0.2645c -0.2611c     
Prev. (DWA)       0.4092c 0.4102c   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.4036c 0.4041c 
Adjusted R2 0.08839 0.0918 0.0493 0.0521 0.0963 0.0979 0.1134 0.1151 0.1094 0.1113 
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Appendix B-III. Full results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund objectives and families 
The tables in this appendix reports results for each cross-sectional regression at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard errors are 
clustered by fund objectives and fund families.  Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using 
first simple percentages and then Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. Panel A presents regression results for the sample of 
1396 funds in 2009, Panel B presents regression results for the sample of 1268 funds in 2011, and Panel C presents regression results for the sample of 1130 
funds in 2013. a, b and c refer to significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
  
Panel A: 2009 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average 
Board Size 0.0158 0.0118 0.0186a 0.0147 0.0195b 0.0159b 0.0069 0.0057 0.0053 0.0042 
Chairman  0.051 0.0787 0.0567 0.0883a 0.0615a 0.0907b 0.0108 0.0214 0.0152 0.0247 
Age -0.0044 -0.0042 -0.0036 -0.0034 -0.002 -0.0019 -0.0041a -0.0041a -0.0034 -0.0033 
Tenure 0.0092 0.0102 0.0083 0.0092a 0.0022 0.003 0.0037 0.0039 0.0025 0.0028 
100*Funds overseen 0.0002 0.0065 0.073 0.0814 0.0681a 0.0762a 0.0269 0.0306 0.016 0.0192 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0156 -0.0111 -0.0303a -0.0253 -0.0185 -0.0139 -0.0124a -0.0109 -0.0115 -0.0101 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0254a 0.0269a 0.0232b 0.0247 0.0156a 0.0168a 0.0096a 0.01b 0.0111b 0.0115b 
# of Committees 0.0042 0.0049 0.0044 0.0049 0.0022 0.0031 -0.0052 -0.0051 -0.0047 -0.0047 
Ave. Meetings 0.0021 0.0024 0.0019 0.0021 0.0022 0.0024 0.0021b 0.0023b 0.0023b 0.0024a 
Board Diversity 
% Independent 0.0438  0.0276  0.1374  0.0367  0.0058  
Independent (Blau)  0.333a  0.3723b  0.2477a  0.0946  0.1124 
% Female 0.1864  0.1496  0.1579  -0.0181  -0.0167  
Gender (Blau)  0.2463a  0.1915a  0.191a  0.008  0.0138 
Other Directorship 0.1077 0.1128 0.0639 0.0673 0.0195 0.0228 0.0351 0.0362 0.0406 0.0419 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.2303 0.1162 0.0445 -0.0975 -0.1518 -0.2781 0.2838 0.2364 0.2616 0.2195 
Tenure Diver.(CV) 0.1264 0.1138 0.0637 0.0529 0.0943 0.0844 0.0214 0.0194 0.0346 0.0322 
Industry Diver. -0.5656 -0.4893 -0.5427 -0.4529 -0.7874a -0.7167a 0.0125 0.0405 0.0333 0.0611 
Ownership Diver. -0.0914 -0.1087 -0.0677 -0.0841 -0.0352 -0.0488 -0.0872a -0.0919b -0.0971b -0.1022b 
Control Variables 
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0294 0.0384 0.003 0.0125 0.037 0.0458 -0.0287 -0.0258 -0.0197 -0.0169 
Ln (Fund size) 0.0094 0.0089 0.0103 0.0099 0.0035 0.0031 0.0109b 0.0109b 0.0087a 0.0087a 
Gross Expense  0.0108 0.0109 0.0253b 0.0256b 0.0176a 0.0178a 0.003 0.0031 0.0005 0.0007 
100*Turnover -0.0024 0.0004 0.0038 0.0065 0.0139 0.0158 -0.0121 -0.0115 -0.0177 -0.0169 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0299 0.0304         
Prev. (FF3)   -0.0368 -0.0355       
Prev. (FF4)     -0.0388 -0.0373     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.3418c -0.3415c   
Prev. (TWA)         -0.4205c -0.4198c 
Adjusted R2 0.0200 0.0228 0.0332 0.0370 0.0387 0.0406 0.1203 0.1210 0.1645 0.1655 
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Panel B: 2011 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size 0.0033 0.0042 0.0041 0.0048 0.0058 0.006 0.0069 0.0079a 0.0069 0.0078a 
Chairman  -0.0063 -0.0002 -0.0173 -0.0105 -0.0221 -0.0154 -0.0161 -0.0184 -0.0194 -0.0207 
Age -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0018 0.0017 0.0018 0.0021 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0019 
Tenure 0.007a 0.0067a 0.0071a 0.0068a 0.0054 0.0051 0.0042a 0.0041a 0.0041a 0.004a 
100*Funds overseen 0.0713a 0.0704a 0.0726a 0.0714a 0.101b 0.1008b 0.0399a 0.0382a 0.0359 0.0344 
Ln (Compensation) 0.015 0.0217 0.0159 0.0236a 0.0205 0.0279 0.0113 0.0139 0.0089 0.0119 
Ln (Ownership) -0.009 -0.0096 -0.0067 -0.0074 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0045 -0.0047 -0.0028 -0.003 
# of Committees -0.0257c -0.026c -0.0422c -0.0425c -0.0502c -0.0501c -0.0229c -0.0233c -0.0219c -0.0223c 
Ave. Meetings 0.0052c 0.0053c 0.0026 0.0028 0.0002 0.0002 0.0037b 0.0038b 0.0038b 0.0039b 
Board Diversity 
% Independent 0.4671b  0.553b  0.543b  0.276a  0.2912a  
Independent (Blau)  0.3152b  0.3687b  0.3442a  0.2461b  0.2482b 
% Female -0.0007  0.0503  -0.122  -0.0074  -0.0009  
Gender (Blau)  -0.0617  -0.011  -0.1076  -0.0341  -0.0293 
Other Directorship -0.0158 -0.0229 -0.0275 -0.0356 -0.0215 -0.0287 0.0015 -0.0025 0.0055 0.0013 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.5687 0.5402 0.9008b 0.8702b 0.7865 0.7562a 0.4066a 0.4356a 0.3924a 0.415a 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0882 -0.0856 -0.0337 -0.0345 -0.0635 -0.0636 -0.0273 -0.0278 -0.0141 -0.0147 
Industry Diver. 0.0856 0.101 0.0736 0.0884 0.2825 0.2723 0.0622 0.0586 0.0626 0.0606 
Ownership Diver. 0.2028c 0.2093c 0.1776b 0.1851b 0.1717b 0.1735b 0.1066b 0.1115b 0.1047b 0.1096b 
Control Variables 
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0682c 0.0662b 0.0637b 0.0617b 0.0401 0.0385 0.0071 0.0047 0.0023 0.0014 
Ln (Fund size) -0.0466c -0.047c -0.0552c -0.0558c -0.0515c -0.0518c -0.028c -0.0281c -0.0285c -0.0286c 
Gross Expense  -0.2158c -0.2156c -0.1957c -0.1951c -0.2142c -0.2132c -0.1253c -0.1239c -0.1295c -0.1282c 
100*Turnover -0.1073c -0.1081c -0.0755c -0.0761c -0.1011c -0.1006c -0.0513c -0.0516c -0.0619c -0.0623c 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0085c 0.0106         
Prev. (FF3)   0.2083c 0.2116c       
Prev. (FF4)     0.0761 0.0789     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.0539b -0.0538b   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.0747c -0.0744c 
Adjusted R2 0.1274 0.1262 0.1283 0.1261 0.0933 0.0919 0.0851 0.0865 0.0926 0.0935 
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Panel C: 2013 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size 0.0053 0.0029 0.005 0.003 0.0027 0.001 0.0155c 0.0142b 0.0161c 0.0148b 
Chairman  -0.0084 -0.0073 -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0013 -0.0047 -0.0219 -0.0194 -0.0286 -0.0267 
Age -0.0066a -0.0057a -0.003 -0.0022 -0.0022 -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0024 -0.0019 
Tenure -0.0014 -0.001 -0.003 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0023 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.0007 
100*Funds overseen 0.0064 0.001 0.0093 0.0151 0.012 0.0171 0.0461a 0.0416a 0.0504a 0.0463a 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0228 0.0191 0.0085 0.0031 0.0084 0.0031 0.0101 0.0085 0.0109 0.0096 
Ln (Ownership) -0.008 -0.0074 -0.0088 -0.0084 -0.0097 -0.0092 -0.0057 -0.0054 -0.0044 -0.0042 
# of Committees 0.0088 0.0086 0.0105 0.0104 0.0149 0.0146 0.0054 0.0053 0.0055 0.0054 
Ave. Meetings 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0015 0.0014 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 
Board Diversity 
% Independent -0.1859  -0.2774  -0.2481  -0.1002  -0.0703  
Independent (Blau)  0.2097a  0.2413a  0.2067  0.1247  0.0997 
% Female 0.0604  0.0938  0.025  0.0443  0.056  
Gender (Blau)  0.1921a  0.2081a  0.1537  0.1011  0.1158 
Other Directorship 0.0877a 0.0933a 0.1004a 0.1063 0.0786 0.0838a -0.0452 -0.0417 -0.0369 -0.034 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.6711b 0.6804b 0.233 0.2473 0.2658 0.2895 -0.1454 -0.148 -0.0683 -0.0688 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0946b -0.1076b -0.1229b -0.1348b -0.0844a -0.0965a -0.0021 -0.0081 -0.0099 -0.0164 
Industry Diver. -0.7203a -0.7341a -0.8329a -0.853a -0.6596 -0.6798a -0.2289 -0.2334 -0.3069 -0.3131 
Ownership Diver. -0.0184 -0.0252 0.0397 0.0339 0.0168 0.0105 -0.0194 -0.0225 -0.0205 -0.0236 
Control Variables 
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0134 0.0164 0.0161 0.0191 -0.005 -0.0023 -0.015 -0.0135 -0.024 -0.0225 
Ln (Fund size) 0.0311c 0.0311c 0.0133 0.0134 0.0205a 0.0206a -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0016 -0.0017 
Gross Expense  0.0401 0.0411 0.0048 0.0057 0.0158 0.0167 0.0048 0.0047 0.0147 0.0148 
100*Turnover -0.0493b -0.0477b -0.0841c -0.0824c -0.0763b -0.0745b 0.038b 0.0385b 0.0366b 0.0371b 
Prev. (CAPM) -0.2866c -0.2824c         
Prev. (FF3)   -0.1709c -0.1665c       
Prev. (FF4)     -0.2648c -0.2613c     
Prev. (DWA)       0.4087c 0.4096c   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.4033c 0.4036c 
Adjusted R2 0.08533 0.0891 0.0493 0.0521 0.0962 0.0979 0.1120 0.1139 0.1085 0.1105 
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Appendix C. Full results for fund-family-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund objectives 
The tables in this appendix report results for each cross-sectional regression at the fund-family level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard errors 
are clustered by fund-family objectives.  Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first 
simple percentages and then Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. Panel A presents regression results for the sample of 329 
fund families in 2009, Panel B presents regression results for the sample of 323 fund families in 2011, and Panel C presents regression results for the sample of 
304 fund families in 2013. a, b and c refer to significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
Panel A: 2009 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size -0.0113 -0.0135 0.0204b 0.0183b 0.0216c 0.0188c -0.0068 -0.0068 -0.0086 -0.0086 
Chairman  0.1061 0.1235 0.058 0.0781 0.0363 0.0633 0.0111 -0.0098 0.0017 0.0018 
Age -0.0094 -0.0093 -0.009 -0.0086 -0.0059 -0.0054 -0.0062a -0.0062a -0.0062a -0.0062a 
Tenure 0.0193 0.0187a 0.0258b 0.0248b 0.0213a 0.0199a 0.0076a 0.0075a 0.0066 0.0065 
100*Funds overseen 0.0813 0.0903 0.1121a 0.1184a 0.2031a 0.2119a 0.0272a 0.0279a 0.0314 0.0325 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0185 -0.016 -0.0081 -0.005 -0.0106 -0.0105 -0.0099 -0.0099 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0361c 0.0362c 0.0273c 0.0269c 0.0124b 0.0119c 0.0101a 0.01a 0.0108a 0.0107a 
# of Committees 0.0097 0.0109 0.0129 0.015 0.0175 0.0202 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0028 -0.0029 
Ave. Meetings 0.0063b 0.0064b 0.0028a 0.0031a 0.0025 0.0028 0.0015b 0.0016a 0.0023b 0.0023a 
Board Diversity 
% Independent -0.0683  0.3535  0.5022  0.0323  0.0051  
Independent (Blau)  0.2668  -0.0592  -0.1078  -0.0175  0.0115 
% Female 0.1496  0.1972b  -0.1701  0.0212  0.0371  
Gender (Blau)  0.1324  0.111b  -0.0937  0.0032  0.0174 
Other Directorship 0.2446a 0.2509b 0.1039 0.1107 0.0436 0.0511 0.0564 0.0556 0.0766a 0.0762a 
Age Diver.(CV) -0.0065 -0.0476 -0.1713 -0.2339 -0.2824 -0.3675 0.2377 0.2322 0.231 0.2258 
Tenure Diver.(CV) 0.3071 0.2947 0.0848 0.0789 0.021 0.0124 0.0612 0.0604 0.0827 0.0811 
Industry Diver. -1.1427b -1.1352b -1.1721a -1.1603 -1.5542b -1.5329b -0.0026 0.0021 -0.0078 -0.0042 
Ownership Diver. -0.0208 -0.0187 0.0108 0.0141 0.1831b 0.189c -0.0572 -0.056 -0.0566 -0.0555 
Control Variables 
Ln (FamilyAge) -0.1062b -0.1004a -0.0141 -0.0086 0.0487 0.0564 -0.0617c -0.0609c -0.0584c -0.0575c 
Ln (Family size) 0.0334c 0.0351c 0.006 0.0077 -0.0087 -0.0062 0.0312c 0.0315c 0.0298c 0.0301c 
Gross Expense  0.0062 0.0065 0.0242b 0.025b 0.0232b 0.0243b 0.0007 0.0008a -0.0018b -0.0017b 
100*Turnover -0.0506 -0.0498 -0.0021 -0.0018 0.0416a 0.042 -0.0275 -0.0276 -0.0324 -0.0325 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0082 0.0068         
Prev. (FF3)   -0.0069 -0.0044       
Prev. (FF4)     0.0946 0.0975     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.3467c -0.3472c   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.3976c -0.398c 




Appendix C. Cont’d 
Panel B: 2011 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size 0.006 0.0074 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0082 0.0076 0.0036a 0.005a 0.004 0.0055 
Chairman  -0.0538 -0.0389 -0.0486 -0.0344 -0.1134 -0.1093 -0.0269 -0.028 -0.0321 -0.033 
Age -0.0038 -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0019 -0.0036 -0.0017 -0.0034 -0.0032 -0.0031 -0.0029 
Tenure 0.0105 0.0092 0.0126a 0.0115 0.0169a 0.0162 0.0054a 0.0055a 0.006a 0.006a 
100*Funds overseen 0.1363a 0.1379a 0.0922b 0.096b 0.1323a 0.1344a 0.0532 0.0505 0.0589a 0.0561a 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0098 -0.0062 0.0037 0.0078 0.0044 0.0088 0.0018 0.0013 -0.0016 -0.002 
Ln (Ownership) -0.0044 -0.0049 -0.0042 -0.0044 0.0124a 0.0129b -0.0038 -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.003 
# of Committees -0.0219 -0.0209 -0.0388 -0.0381 -0.0581b -0.0599b -0.019 -0.0193 -0.0199 -0.0202 
Ave. Meetings 0.0065b 0.0064c 0.0037 0.0044a 0.0004 0.0011b 0.0041c 0.0042c 0.0044c 0.0045c 
Board Diversity 
% Independent 0.804b  0.9012b  1.0713b  0.3545  0.4018a  
Independent (Blau)  0.5303a  0.59b  0.7799b  0.3526a  0.3912b 
% Female -0.1318  0.1446  -0.1251  -0.0151  -0.0243  
Gender (Blau)  -0.1519  0.1079  0.0714  -0.0544  -0.0601 
Other Directorship 0.0156 0.0011 0.0076 -0.009 0.0497 0.0394 0.0213 0.0178 0.0257 0.0216 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.7279 0.6358 1.4615c 1.3856c 1.1236 1.1138 0.3462b 0.3451b 0.3162a 0.314a 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0681 -0.0676 -0.0016 -0.0141 -0.1083 -0.1414 0.0223 0.0236 0.0182 0.0189 
Industry Diver. 0.4486 0.4901 0.4906 0.5315 1.2856b 1.2661b 0.2858 0.3042 0.2906 0.3097 
Ownership Diver. 0.1807 0.171 0.1198 0.1104 0.1148 0.0931 0.0944 0.0954 0.1132 0.1137 
Control Variables 
Ln (Family Age) 0.0725c 0.072c 0.0482 0.0461 -0.0998c -0.1056c 0.0147 0.0104 0.0155 0.0109 
Ln (Family size) 0.0757b 0.0757b 0.0765b 0.0773b 0.0724c 0.0749c 0.0365c 0.0359c 0.0363c 0.0357c 
Gross Expense  -0.3835b -0.3794b -0.3102b -0.3073b -0.3761b -0.3724b -0.1559c -0.153c -0.1673c -0.1641c 
Turnovera100 -0.1616b -0.1605b -0.1257b -0.1254b -0.2182c -0.2172c -0.067c -0.0665c -0.0742c -0.0738c 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0882 0.0965         
Prev. (FF3)   0.1507 0.1635       
Prev. (FF4)     0.0316 0.0445     
Prev. (DWA)       0.0459 0.0487   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.0419 0.0454 
Adjusted R2 0.2714 0.2654 0.2208 0.2108 0.2548 0.2479 0.1608 0.1634 0.1754 0.1779 
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Appendix C. Cont’d 
Panel C: 2013 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size -0.0022 -0.0056 -0.0022 -0.005 -0.0059 -0.008 0.012 0.0097 0.0113 0.0088 
Chairman  -0.0275 -0.0179 -0.0243 -0.0246 -0.0204 -0.0253 -0.0393 -0.0309 -0.0436 -0.0354 
Age -0.0054 -0.0048 -0.0032 -0.0027 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0006 
Tenure 0.0022 0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0036 -0.0036 0.0035b 0.0035b 0.0041b 0.0039b 
100*Funds overseen 0.0188 0.0311 -0.0273 -0.0218 -0.0156 -0.0137 -0.1159 -0.1066 -0.1207 -0.1115 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0042 0.0066 -0.0081 -0.0074 -0.01 -0.0099 0.0074 0.0088 0.0053 0.0071 
Ln (Ownership) -0.0125 -0.0128 -0.0137 -0.0138 -0.0145 -0.0144 -0.0096 -0.0101 -0.009 -0.0095 
# of Committees 0.0007 0.0006 0.0078 0.0072 0.0038 0.003 0.0197b 0.0198c 0.0191b 0.0192b 
Ave. Meetings 0.002 0.0017 -0.0031 -0.0034 -0.0028 -0.0031 0.0031b 0.0029b 0.0025b 0.0023b 
Board Diversity 
% Independent 0.0755  0.082  0.0855  0.01  0.0497  
Independent (Blau)  0.0692  -0.0525  -0.1048  0.107  0.056 
% Female 0.2244  0.3113  0.2332  0.2366b  0.2703b  
Gender (Blau)  0.2777  0.3454  0.2904  0.2149c  0.2514c 
Other Directorship 0.0917a 0.0957a 0.1301b 0.1306b 0.1091b 0.1091c 0.0981b 0.0951b 0.0872b 0.0852b 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.3927a 0.4074a 0.1409 0.1584 0.2287 0.2522 -0.2287 -0.2302 -0.1926 -0.192 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0611 -0.0672 -0.0687 -0.0755 -0.0588 -0.0665 -0.017 -0.0185 -0.015 -0.0176 
Industry Diver. -0.3406 -0.3508 -0.794 -0.8254 -0.4777 -0.52 -0.0055 0.0018 -0.1148 -0.1077 
Ownership Diver. 0.0912 0.0894 0.0745 0.0694 0.0447 0.0377 -0.0693a -0.0668a -0.0714b -0.0703b 
Control Variables 
Ln (Family Age) 0.0113 0.0111 0.006 0.006 0.0086 0.0073 -0.0005 0.0015 -0.0125 -0.011 
Ln (Family Size) 0.0598 0.0574 0.057 0.0547 0.0656 0.0635 0.0024 0.0013 0.0087 0.0074 
Gross Expense  0.1653 0.1636 0.1869 0.1864 0.1744 0.1753 -0.0182 -0.0213 0.0029 0.0002 
100*Turnover -0.0511b -0.0543b -0.0896c -0.0915c -0.0825c -0.0838c 0.0709a 0.0687a 0.0689a 0.0665a 
Prev. (CAPM) -0.169 -0.1675         
Prev. (FF3)   -0.0558 -0.0541       
Prev. (FF4)     -0.216 -0.2137     
Prev. (DWA)       0.4313c 0.4265c   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.4163c 0.409c 
Adjusted R2 0.09098 0.0963 0.0731 0.0777 0.1013 0.1056 0.1938 0.1967 0.1808 0.1840 
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Appendix D-I. Full results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund objectives for the robustness test samples 
The tables in this appendix reports results for each cross-sectional regression for the smaller sample at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard 
errors are clustered by fund objectives. To be included, each fund share class is required to have at least 48-month consecutive returns and NAVs. Separate cross-
sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five fund performance measures using simple percentages and then using Blau’s diversity index as the independence 
and gender diversity measures. The sample consists of 1266 funds in Panel A, 1189 funds in Panel B, and 1089 funds in Panel C. a, b and c refer to significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
Panel A: 2009 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average   
Board Size 0.0174b 0.0149b 0.0114b 0.0099b 0.0111c 0.0092c 0.004b 0.0026 0.0018 0.0004 
Chairman  0.012a 0.025 0.0255 0.0335a 0.0287 0.0386b -0.0063 0.0031 0.0042 0.0128 
Age -0.002 -0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0006 
Tenure 0.0045b 0.005b 0.0032 0.0035 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0019 0.0022 0.0015 0.0019 
100aFunds overseen 0.0324 0.0343 0.0574a 0.0581a 0.0531b 0.0543b 0.0342 0.0361 0.028a 0.0295 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0108 -0.0079 -0.0167 -0.0148 -0.0082 -0.0059 -0.0028 -0.0009 -0.0031 -0.0013 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0175c 0.0186c 0.0108b 0.0115b 0.0084a 0.0092a 0.0082c 0.0089c 0.0089c 0.0096c 
# of Committees -0.0091 -0.008 0.0001b 0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0015 -0.0078b -0.0074b -0.006c -0.0057c 
Ave. Meetings 0.0008 0.001 0.0012 0.0013a 0.001 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0013 0.0014 
Board Diversity  
% Independent 0.1171b  0.0291  0.1265a  0.0147  -0.0182  
Independent (Blau)  0.0969  0.0955  0.0395  0.1126a  0.1347b 
% Female 0.1035b  0.0885c  0.1373b  0.0314a  0.0264  
Gender (Blau)  0.1446c  0.1045a  0.1459a  0.0515a  0.0518a 
Other Directorship 0.0328 0.0376 0.0158 0.0184 0.0069 0.0098 0.0142 0.0163 0.021 0.0233 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.243 0.1994 0.0315 0.0023 -0.0972 -0.1299 0.139 0.1004 0.1425 0.1071 
Tenure Diver.(CV) 0.07 0.06 0.0849 0.0782 0.1068 0.0983 0.0291 0.0237 0.0468a 0.0413a 
Industry Diver. -0.5706a -0.5298 -0.2636 -0.2343 -0.4283 -0.4013 0.0856 0.1194 0.0882 0.1229 
Ownership Diver. -0.0083 -0.0144 -0.0222 -0.0261 -0.0016 -0.0052 -0.0907 -0.0943 -0.0919 -0.0959 
Control Variables  
Ln (Fund Age) -0.0226 -0.0184 -0.0477 -0.0452 -0.0171 -0.0139 -0.0232 -0.0208 -0.0134 -0.011 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.004 -0.0044 0.0065b 0.0063b -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0087a 0.0086a 0.0094b 0.0093b 
Gross Expense  0.0659b 0.0647b 0.0594c 0.0586c 0.0502b 0.0491b 0.0406c 0.0398c 0.042c 0.0412c 
100aTurnover -0.0196 -0.0185 -0.0221 -0.0213 -0.0062 -0.0057 0.0059 0.0066 0.0057 0.0066 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.4107b 0.4079b         
Prev. (FF3)   0.0146 0.0133       
Prev. (FF4)     0.0696b 0.0683b     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.0688 -0.0701   
Prev. (TWA)         -0.2004c -0.2016c 
Adjusted R2 0.1375 0.1381 0.0312 0.0322 0.0455 0.0453 0.0319 0.0336 0.0504 0.0527 
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Appendix D-I. Cont’d 
Panel B: 2011 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average            
Board Size -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0026 -0.0021 0.002 0.0026 0.0018 0.0023 
Chairman  0.0065 0.0065 0.0047 0.0052 0.0044 0.004 0.0053 -0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0068 
Age -0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.002 -0.0026b -0.0026b -0.0018 -0.0018 
Tenure 0.0048 0.0047 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.0049 0.0037 0.0037 0.0032 0.0032 
100aFunds overseen 0.0594b 0.0586b 0.0569a 0.0564b 0.0581b 0.0577b 0.0319a 0.0309a 0.027b 0.026b 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0112b 0.0125a 0.0114c 0.0126b 0.0112b 0.0115a 0.0127b 0.0114b 0.0089 0.0078a 
Ln (Ownership) -0.0055 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.006 -0.0059 -0.0047 -0.0045 -0.0029 -0.0027 
# of Committees -0.0128b -0.0129b -0.0174c -0.0175c -0.0156c -0.0157c -0.0077 -0.0078 -0.0069 -0.007 
Ave. Meetings 0.0032c 0.0032b 0.0025b 0.0025a 0.0029c 0.0029c 0.002b 0.002b 0.0023b 0.0023b 
Board Diversity           
% Independent 0.1025  0.0927  0.0299  -0.0235  -0.0158  
Independent (Blau)  0.091  0.0793  0.0414  0.0399  -0.0399 
% Female -0.0025  -0.0249  -0.0607  -0.0429  -0.0291  
Gender (Blau)  -0.0266  -0.0445  -0.0731  -0.0347  -0.0228 
Other Directorship -0.0093 -0.0111 -0.0211 -0.0226 -0.0223 -0.023 -0.0031 -0.0031 0.0032 0.0031 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.1089 0.1166 0.1804 0.1853 0.1376 0.1481 0.0649 0.1067 0.076 0.1137a 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0819 -0.0804 -0.072 -0.0695 -0.0702 -0.0662 -0.042 -0.0417 -0.0302 -0.0303 
Industry Diver. 0.2007 0.2039 0.2447 0.2478 0.2808 0.2826 0.2567 0.2408 0.2912 0.2769 
Ownership Diver. 0.0771 0.0798 0.0342 0.0363 0.0232 0.0243 0.0331 0.0338 0.0284 0.0292 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0281b 0.027a 0.0118b 0.0109a 0.005 0.0041 -0.0095 -0.0104 -0.0159 -0.0167 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.0201a -0.0202a -0.0209b -0.0209b -0.0178b -0.0177b -0.0113b -0.0111b -0.0112b -0.0111b 
Gross Expense  -0.1521b -0.1515b -0.1332b -0.1326b -0.1177b -0.1172b -0.0925c -0.0916c -0.0973c -0.0964c 
100aTurnover -0.0789a -0.0793a -0.0652a -0.0656a -0.064a -0.0643a -0.0218 -0.0217 -0.0306 -0.0305 
Prev. (CAPM) -0.1092c -0.1086c         
Prev. (FF3)   0.0246 0.0254       
Prev. (FF4)     0.097a 0.0982a     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.0054 -0.0045   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.0174 -0.0166 




Appendix D-I. Cont’d 
Panel C: 2013 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size 0.0154c 0.0137b 0.0098b 0.0084b 0.0099b 0.0086b 0.0115c 0.0104c 0.0123c 0.0112c 
Chairman  -0.0213 -0.0196 -0.0347 -0.0345 -0.0335 -0.0332 -0.0287 -0.0286 -0.0307 -0.0312 
Age -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0002 0.0006 0.0004 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0004 
Tenure -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.002 -0.0018 0.0014a 0.0016a 0.0019b 0.002b 
100aFunds overseen 0.0196a 0.0233b 0.0087 0.0118 0.0064 0.0093 0.0036 0.0063 -0.0004 0.002 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0018 0.001 0.005 0.0034 0.0052 0.0035 0.0048 0.0035 0.0084 0.0072 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0152 0.0151 0.0109a 0.0109a 0.0106a 0.0106a -0.0082 -0.0081 -0.0081 -0.0079 
# of Committees -0.0134b -0.0134b 0.0104 0.0103 0.01 0.01 -0.0073b -0.0073b -0.0082b -0.008b 
Ave. Meetings 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.001 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 
Board Diversity 
% Independent 0.0297  0.0798  0.0804  0.0567  0.0429b  
Independent (Blau)  0.0686b  0.0878b  0.0867b  0.0678  0.0534b 
% Female 0.1632  0.1235  0.1293  0.0826c  0.0801  
Gender (Blau)  0.2094c  0.1686a  0.1702a  0.1268c  0.1288 
Other Directorship 0.0237 0.0261 0.0152 0.0179 0.0164 0.019 -0.0176 -0.0155 -0.0147 -0.013 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.0576 0.0543 0.0653 0.0637 0.0723 0.0715 0.2884b 0.2853c 0.2282b 0.2221 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.1172b -0.125b -0.0712b -0.0781b -0.0727b -0.0793b -0.01 -0.0159 -0.0133 -0.0196 
Industry Diver. -0.3098 -0.3224 -0.3467 -0.359 -0.3658 -0.3783 -0.0177 -0.0269 -0.0903 -0.1006 
Ownership Diver. -0.0928c -0.0908c 0.0516 0.0497 0.0516 0.0501 -0.0475c -0.0455c -0.0537c -0.0514c 
Control Variables 
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0364b 0.038b 0.0053 0.0068 0.0082 0.0098 -0.0135 -0.0124 -0.015 -0.0139 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.0068 -0.0069 -0.0081 -0.008 -0.0099 -0.0099 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0038 
Gross Expense  -0.1243b -0.1231b -0.1001a -0.0994a -0.1034a -0.1028a -0.0643c -0.0637c -0.0509b -0.05b 
100aTurnover -0.0034 -0.0028 -0.0159a -0.0151a -0.016a -0.0152a 0.0278b 0.0284b 0.0272a 0.028a 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.3393c 0.3424c         
Prev. (FF3)   0.1712c 0.1739c       
Prev. (FF4)     0.1983c 0.2012c     
Prev. (DWA)       0.3002c 0.302c   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.2897c 0.291c 
Adjusted R2 0.2312 0.2355 0.1145 0.1189 0.1173 0.1215 0.1597 0.1640 0.1527 0.1573 
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Appendix D-II. Full results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund families for the robustness test samples 
The tables in this appendix report results for each cross-sectional regression for the smaller sample at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard 
errors are clustered by fund families. To be included, each fund share class is required to have at least 48-month consecutive returns and NAVs. Separate cross-sectional 
regressions are conducted for five different fund performance measures using simple percentages and then Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender 
diversity measures. The sample consists of 1266 funds in Panel A, 1189 funds in Panel B, and 1089 funds in Panel C. a, b and c refer to significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: 2009 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average            
Board Size 0.0174b 0.0149a 0.0114a 0.0099 0.0111b 0.0092b 0.004 0.0026 0.0018 0.0004 
Chairman  0.012 0.025 0.0255 0.0335 0.0287 0.0386 -0.0063 0.0031 0.0042 0.0128 
Age -0.002 -0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0006 
Tenure 0.0045 0.005 0.0032 0.0035 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0019 0.0022 0.0015 0.0019 
100aFunds overseen 0.0324 0.0343 0.0574 0.0581 0.0531a 0.0543a 0.0342 0.0361 0.028 0.0295 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0108 -0.0079 -0.0167 -0.0148 -0.0082 -0.0059 -0.0028 -0.0009 -0.0031 -0.0013 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0175a 0.0186a 0.0108 0.0115 0.0084 0.0092 0.0082 0.0089 0.0089 0.0096 
# of Committees -0.0091 -0.008 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0015 -0.0078 -0.0074 -0.006 -0.0057 
Ave. Meetings 0.0008 0.001 0.0012 0.0013 0.001 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0013 0.0014 
Board Diversity           
% Independent 0.1171  0.0291  0.1265  0.0147  -0.0182  
Independent (Blau)  0.0969  0.0955  0.0395  0.1126  0.1347 
% Female 0.1035a  0.0885a  0.1373  0.0314  0.0264  
Gender (Blau)  0.1446a  0.1045a  0.1459a  0.0515b  0.0518b 
Other Directorship 0.0328 0.0376 0.0158 0.0184 0.0069 0.0098 0.0142 0.0163 0.021 0.0233 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.243 0.1994 0.0315 0.0023 -0.0972 -0.1299 0.139 0.1004 0.1425 0.1071 
Tenure Diver.(CV) 0.07 0.06 0.0849 0.0782 0.1068a 0.0983 0.0291 0.0237 0.0468 0.0413 
Industry Diver. -0.5706 -0.5298 -0.2636 -0.2343 -0.4283 -0.4013 0.0856 0.1194 0.0882 0.1229 
Ownership Diver. -0.0083c -0.0144c -0.0222 -0.0261 -0.0016 -0.0052 -0.0907b -0.0943c -0.0919c -0.0959c 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) -0.0226 -0.0184 -0.0477a -0.0452a -0.0171 -0.0139 -0.0232 -0.0208 -0.0134 -0.011a 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.004 -0.0044 0.0065 0.0063 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0087a 0.0086a 0.0094a 0.0093b 
Gross Expense  0.0659 0.0647 0.0594b 0.0586a 0.0502b 0.0491a 0.0406 0.0398b 0.042b 0.0412 
100aTurnover -0.0196 -0.0185 -0.0221 -0.0213 -0.0062 -0.0057 0.0059 0.0066 0.0057 0.0066 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.4107c 0.4079c         
Prev. (FF3)   0.0146 0.0133       
Prev. (FF4)     0.0696 0.0683     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.0688 -0.0701a   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.2004c -0.2016c 
Adjusted R2 0.1375 0.1381 0.0312 0.0322 0.0455 0.0453 0.0319 0.0336 0.0504 0.0527 
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Appendix D-II. Cont’d 
Panel B: 2011 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average            
Board Size -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0026 -0.0021 0.002 0.0026 0.0018 0.0023 
Chairman  0.0065 0.0065 0.0047 0.0052 0.0044 0.004 0.0053 -0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0068 
Age -0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.002 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0018 
Tenure 0.0048a 0.0047 0.005b 0.005a 0.005b 0.0049a 0.0037b 0.0037b 0.0032a 0.0032a 
100aFunds overseen 0.0594b 0.0586b 0.0569b 0.0564b 0.0581b 0.0577b 0.0319 0.0309 0.027 0.026 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0112 0.0125 0.0114 0.0126 0.0112 0.0115 0.0127a 0.0114 0.0089 0.0078 
Ln (Ownership) -0.0055 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.006 -0.0059 -0.0047 -0.0045 -0.0029 -0.0027 
# of Committees -0.0128a -0.0129a -0.0174b -0.0175c -0.0156b -0.0157a -0.0077 -0.0078 -0.0069 -0.007 
Ave. Meetings 0.0032c 0.0032c 0.0025b 0.0025b 0.0029c 0.0029c 0.002c 0.002c 0.0023c 0.0023c 
Board Diversity           
% Independent 0.1025  0.0927  0.0299  -0.0235  -0.0158  
Independent (Blau)  -0.091  -0.0793  -0.0414  -0.0399  -0.0399 
% Female -0.0025  -0.0249  -0.0607  -0.0429  -0.0291  
Gender (Blau)  -0.0266  -0.0445  -0.0731  -0.0347  -0.0228 
Other Directorship -0.0093 -0.0111 -0.0211 -0.0226 -0.0223 -0.023 -0.0031 -0.0031 0.0032 0.0031 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.1089 0.1166 0.1804 0.1853 0.1376 0.1481 0.0649 0.1067 0.076 0.1137 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0819 -0.0804 -0.072 -0.0695 -0.0702 -0.0662 -0.042 -0.0417 -0.0302 -0.0303 
Industry Diver. 0.2007 0.2039 0.2447 0.2478 0.2808 0.2826 0.2567 0.2408 0.2912 0.2769 
Ownership Diver. 0.0771 0.0798 0.0342 0.0363 0.0232 0.0243 0.0331 0.0338 0.0284 0.0292 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0281 0.027 0.0118 0.0109 0.005 0.0041 -0.0095 -0.0104 -0.0159 -0.0167 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.0201c -0.0202c -0.0209c -0.0209c -0.0178c -0.0177c -0.0113c -0.0111c -0.0112c -0.0111c 
Gross Expense  -0.1521c -0.1515c -0.1332c -0.1326c -0.1177c -0.1172c -0.0925c -0.0916c -0.0973c -0.0964c 
100aTurnover -0.0789c -0.0793c -0.0652c -0.0656c -0.064c -0.0643c -0.0218a -0.0217a -0.0306b -0.0305c 
Prev. (CAPM) -0.1092c -0.1086c         
Prev. (FF3)   0.0246 0.0254       
Prev. (FF4)     0.097c 0.0982c     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.0054 -0.0045   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.0174 -0.0166 
Adjusted R2 0.1552 0.1554 0.1015 0.1019 0.1121 0.1129 0.0879 0.0879 0.0980 0.0982 
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Appendix D-II. Cont’d 
Panel C: 2013 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average           
Board Size 0.0154c 0.0137c 0.0098b 0.0085a 0.0099b 0.0086a 0.0115c 0.0104b 0.0123c 0.0112c 
Chairman  -0.021 -0.0193 -0.0344 -0.0341 -0.0331 -0.0329 -0.0288 -0.0287 -0.0307 -0.0313 
Age -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0004 
Tenure 0 0.0001 -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.002 -0.0017 0.0014 0.0016 0.0019 0.002 
100aFunds overseen 0.0193 0.0231 0.0084 0.0115 0.006 0.009 0.0037 0.0064 -0.0004 0.0021 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0018 0.001 0.005 0.0034 0.0052 0.0035 0.0047 0.0035 0.0084 0.0072 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0152c 0.0151c 0.0109a 0.0109a 0.0106a 0.0106 0.0082a 0.0081a 0.0081a 0.0079a 
# of Committees -0.0134b -0.0134a 0.0103 0.0103 0.01 0.01 0.0073 0.0073 -0.0082a -0.008 
Ave. Meetings 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0009 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 
Board Diversity           
% Independent -0.0301  -0.0804  -0.0811  -0.0565  -0.0428  
Independent (Blau)  0.0692  0.0888  0.0876  0.0676  0.0533 
% Female 0.1626a  0.1225  0.1284  0.0828  0.0801  
Gender (Blau)  0.209c  0.1679b  0.1695b  0.1269b  0.1288b 
Other Directorship 0.0241 0.0265 0.0158 0.0184 0.0169 0.0195 -0.0177 -0.0157 -0.0147 -0.0131 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.0589 0.0556 0.0632 0.0617 0.0704 0.0696 0.2889a 0.2857a 0.2283 0.2223 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.1173c -0.1252c -0.0713b -0.0782 -0.0729b -0.0795b -0.01 -0.0159 -0.0133 -0.0196 
Industry Diver. -0.3125 -0.325 -0.3507 -0.3629 -0.3695 -0.3819 -0.0168 -0.0261 -0.09 -0.1004 
Ownership Diver. -0.0923a -0.0903a -0.0508 -0.0489 -0.0509 -0.0493 0.0477 0.0456 0.0538 0.0515 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0366a 0.0382b 0.0056 0.0071 0.0085 0.01 -0.0136 -0.0124 -0.015 -0.0139 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.0067 -0.0068 -0.0078 -0.0078 -0.0097 -0.0097 -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0039 
Gross Expense  -0.1241c -0.123c -0.0999c -0.0992c -0.1031c -0.1026c -0.0644c -0.0637c -0.051c -0.05c 
100aTurnover -0.0035 -0.0028 -0.016 -0.0153 -0.0161 -0.0153 0.0278c 0.0284c 0.0272b 0.028b 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.3389c 0.3421c         
Prev. (FF3)   0.1705c 0.1732c       
Prev. (FF4)     0.1976c 0.2004c     
Prev. (DWA)       0.3006c 0.3024c   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.2898c 0.2912c 
Adjusted R2 0.2312 0.2355 0.1143 0.1187 0.1171 0.1212 0.1595 0.1638 0.1525 0.1571 
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Appendix D-III. Full results for fund-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund objectives and families for the robustness test samples 
The tables in this appendix report results for each cross-sectional regression for the smaller sample at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard 
errors are clustered by fund objectives and fund families. To be included, each fund share class is required to have at least 48-month consecutive returns and NAVs. 
Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for five different fund performance measures using simple percentages and then Blau’s diversity index as the 
independence and gender diversity measures. The sample consists of 1266 funds in Panel A, 1189 funds in Panel B, and 1089 funds in Panel C. a, b and c refer to 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: 2009 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average            
Board Size 0.0174b 0.0149 0.0114a 0.0099 0.0111c 0.0092b 0.004 0.0026 0.0018 0.0004 
Chairman  0.012 0.025 0.0255 0.0335 0.0287 0.0386 -0.0063 0.0031 0.0042 0.0128 
Age -0.002 -0.0017 -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.001 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0006 
Tenure 0.0045 0.005 0.0032 0.0035 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0019 0.0022 0.0015 0.0019 
100aFunds overseen 0.0324 0.0343 0.0574 0.0581 0.0531a 0.0543a 0.0342 0.0361 0.028 0.0295 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0108 -0.0079 -0.0167 -0.0148 -0.0082 -0.0059 -0.0028 -0.0009 -0.0031 -0.0013 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0175 0.0186a 0.0108 0.0115 0.0084 0.0092 0.0082 0.0089 0.0089 0.0096 
# of Committees -0.0091 -0.008 0.0001 0.0007 -0.0026 -0.0015 -0.0078 -0.0074 -0.006 -0.0057 
Ave. Meetings 0.0008 0.001 0.0012 0.0013 0.001 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0013 0.0014 
Board Diversity           
% Independent 0.1171  0.0291  0.1265  0.0147  -0.0182  
Independent (Blau)  0.0969  0.0955  0.0395  0.1126  0.1347 
% Female 0.1035  0.0885  0.1373  0.0314  0.0264  
Gender (Blau)  0.1446b  0.1045a  0.1459b  0.0515b  0.0518a 
Other Directorship 0.0328 0.0376 0.0158 0.0184 0.0069 0.0098 0.0142 0.0163 0.021 0.0233 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.243 0.1994 0.0315 0.0023 -0.0972 -0.1299 0.139 0.1004 0.1425 0.1071 
Tenure Diver.(CV) 0.07 0.06 0.0849 0.0782 0.1068a 0.0983a 0.0291 0.0237 0.0468 0.0413 
Industry Diver. -0.5706 -0.5298 -0.2636 -0.2343 -0.4283 -0.4013 0.0856 0.1194 0.0882 0.1229 
Ownership Diver. -0.0083 -0.0144 -0.0222 -0.0261 -0.0016 -0.0052 -0.0907b -0.0943b -0.0919b -0.0959b 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) -0.0226 -0.0184 -0.0477a -0.0452a -0.0171 -0.0139 -0.0232 -0.0208 -0.0134 -0.011 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.004 -0.0044 0.0065 0.0063 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0087a 0.0086a 0.0094a 0.0093a 
Gross Expense  0.0659 0.0647 0.0594a 0.0586a 0.0502b 0.0491b 0.0406b 0.0398b 0.042b 0.0412b 
100aTurnover -0.0196 -0.0185 -0.0221 -0.0213 -0.0062 -0.0057 0.0059 0.0066 0.0057 0.0066 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.4107 c 0.4079c         
Prev. (FF3)   0.0146 0.0133       
Prev. (FF4)     0.0696 0.0683     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.0688a -0.0701a   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.2004c -0.2016c 
Adjusted R2 0.1375 0.1381 0.0312 0.0322 0.0455 0.0453 0.0319 0.0336 0.0504 0.0527 
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Appendix D-III. Cont’d 
Panel B: 2011 
Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average            
Board Size -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0006 -0.0026 -0.0021 0.002 0.0026 0.0018 0.0023 
Chairman  0.0065 0.0065 0.0047 0.0052 0.0044 0.004 0.0053 -0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0068 
Age -0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.002 -0.0026 -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0018 
Tenure 0.0048a 0.0047a 0.005b 0.005b 0.005b 0.0049b 0.0037b 0.0037b 0.0032a 0.0032a 
100aFunds overseen 0.0594a 0.0586b 0.0569b 0.0564b 0.0581b 0.0577b 0.0319a 0.0309a 0.027 0.026 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0112 0.0125 0.0114 0.0126 0.0112 0.0115 0.0127a 0.0114 0.0089 0.0078 
Ln (Ownership) -0.0055 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.006 -0.0059 -0.0047 -0.0045 -0.0029 -0.0027 
# of Committees -0.0128a -0.0129a -0.0174c -0.0175c -0.0156c -0.0157b -0.0077 -0.0078a -0.0069 -0.007 
Ave. Meetings 0.0032c 0.0032c 0.0025b  0.0025b 0.0029c 0.0029c 0.002c 0.002c 0.0023c 0.0023c 
Board Diversity           
% Independent 0.1025  0.0927  0.0299  -0.0235  -0.0158  
Independent (Blau)  -0.091  -0.0793  -0.0414  -0.0399  -0.0399 
% Female -0.0025  -0.0249  -0.0607  -0.0429  -0.0291  
Gender (Blau)  -0.0266  -0.0445  -0.0731  -0.0347  -0.0228 
Other Directorship -0.0093 -0.0111 -0.0211 -0.0226 -0.0223 -0.023 -0.0031 -0.0031 0.0032 0.0031 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.1089 0.1166 0.1804 0.1853 0.1376 0.1481 0.0649 0.1067 0.076 0.1137 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0819 -0.0804 -0.072 -0.0695 -0.0702 -0.0662 -0.042 -0.0417 -0.0302 -0.0303 
Industry Diver. 0.2007 0.2039 0.2447 0.2478 0.2808 0.2826 0.2567 0.2408 0.2912 0.2769 
Ownership Diver. 0.0771 0.0798 0.0342 0.0363 0.0232 0.0243 0.0331 0.0338 0.0284 0.0292 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0281 0.027 0.0118 0.0109 0.005 0.0041 -0.0095 -0.0104 -0.0159 -0.0167 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.0201c -0.0202c -0.0209c -0.0209c -0.0178c -0.0177c -0.0113c -0.0111c -0.0112c -0.0111c 
Gross Expense  -0.1521c -0.1515c -0.1332c -0.1326c -0.1177c -0.1172c -0.0925c -0.0916c -0.0973c -0.0964c 
100aTurnover -0.0789c -0.0793c -0.0652c -0.0656c -0.064c -0.0643c -0.0218c -0.0217a -0.0306b -0.0305b 
Prev. (CAPM) -0.1092c -0.1086c         
Prev. (FF3)   0.0246 0.0254       
Prev. (FF4)     0.097c 0.0982c     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.0054 -0.0045   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.0174 -0.0166 
Adjusted R2 0.1552 0.1554 0.1015 0.1019 0.1121 0.1129 0.0879 0.0879 0.0980 0.0982 
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Appendix D-III. Cont’d 
Panel C: 2013 
Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average            
Board Size 0.0154c 0.0137c 0.0098b 0.0085b 0.0099b 0.0086b 0.0115c 0.0104c 0.0123c 0.0112c 
Chairman  -0.021 -0.0193 -0.0344 -0.0341 -0.0331 -0.0329 -0.0288 -0.0287 -0.0307a -0.0313a 
Age -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0004 
Tenure 0 0.0001 -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.002 -0.0017 0.0014 0.0016 0.0019 0.002 
100aFunds overseen 0.0193 0.0231 0.0084 0.0115 0.006 0.009 0.0037 0.0064 -0.0004 0.0021 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0018 0.001 0.005 0.0034 0.0052 0.0035 0.0047 0.0035 0.0084 0.0072 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0152c 0.0151c 0.0109a 0.0109a 0.0106a 0.0106a 0.0082a 0.0081a 0.0081a 0.0079a 
# of Committees -0.0134b -0.0134b 0.0103 0.0103 0.01 0.01 0.0073 0.0073 -0.0082a -0.008 
Ave. Meetings 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0009 0.0008 0.0006 0.0006 0.0004 
Board Diversity           
% Independent -0.0301  -0.0804  -0.0811  -0.0565  -0.0428  
Independent (Blau)  0.0692  0.0888  0.0876  0.0676  0.0533 
% Female 0.1626a  0.1225  0.1284  0.0828  0.0801  
Gender (Blau)  0.209c  0.1679b  0.1695c  0.1269b  0.1288b 
Other Directorship 0.0241 0.0265 0.0158 0.0184 0.0169 0.0195 -0.0177 -0.0157 -0.0147 -0.0131 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.0589 0.0556 0.0632 0.0617 0.0704 0.0696 0.2889a 0.2857a 0.2283 0.2223 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.1173c -0.1252c -0.0713b -0.0782b -0.0729b -0.0795c -0.01 -0.0159 -0.0133 -0.0196 
Industry Diver. -0.3125 -0.325 -0.3507 -0.3629 -0.3695 -0.3819a -0.0168 -0.0261 -0.09 -0.1004 
Ownership Diver. 0.0923a 0.0903a 0.0508 0.0489 0.0509 0.0493 0.0477 0.0456 0.0538 0.0515 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0366b 0.0382b 0.0056 0.0071 0.0085 0.01 -0.0136 -0.0124 -0.015 -0.0139 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.0067 -0.0068 -0.0078 -0.0078 -0.0097 -0.0097 -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0039 
Gross Expense  -0.1241c -0.123c -0.0999c -0.0992c -0.1031c -0.1026c -0.0644c -0.0637c -0.051c -0.05c 
100aTurnover -0.0035 -0.0028 -0.016 -0.0153 -0.0161 -0.0153 0.0278c 0.0284c 0.0272c 0.028c 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.3389c 0.3421c         
Prev. (FF3)   0.1705c 0.1732c       
Prev. (FF4)     0.1976c 0.2004c     
Prev. (DWA)       0.3006c 0.3024c   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.2898c 0.2912c 
Adjusted R2 0.2312 0.2355 0.1143 0.1187 0.1171 0.1212 0.1595 0.1638 0.1525 0.1571 
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Appendix E. Full results for fund-family-level cross-sectional regressions with standard errors clustered by fund objectives for the robustness test samples 
The tables in this appendix report results for each cross-sectional regression for the smaller sample at the fund-family level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the 
standard errors are clustered by fund-family objectives. To be included, each fund share class is required to have at least 48-month consecutive returns and NAVs. 
Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for five different fund performance measures using simple percentages and then Blau’s diversity index as the 
independence and gender diversity measures. The sample consists of 294 fund families in Panel A, 308 fund families in Panel B, and 299 fund families in Panel C. a, b 
and c refer to significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
Panel A: 2009 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average           
Board Size -0.0111 -0.0124 -0.0022 -0.0021 0.0013 0.0004 -0.0059 -0.0062 -0.0085 -0.0087 
Chairman  0.079 0.086 0.0593 0.0572 0.0375 0.0443 -0.0023 0.0002 0.0128 0.015 
Age -0.003 -0.0029 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0013 -0.0014 
Tenure 0.0102 0.0101 0.0051 0.0053 0.0035 0.0029 0.0064a 0.0065a 0.0052 0.0054 
100aFunds overseen 0.0145 0.0179 -0.0027 -0.0033 0.0747b 0.0749c 0.0067 0.0097 0.0092 0.0124 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0087 0.0091 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0052 -0.0037 0.0107 0.0102 0.0119 0.0113 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0205b 0.021b 0.0111 0.0111 0.0052 0.005 0.0064b 0.0068b 0.006b 0.0064b 
# of Committees 0.008 0.0088 0.0164 0.0163 0.0111 0.0121 0.0022 0.0021 0.0018 0.0017 
Ave. Meetings 0.0024c 0.0025c -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0009 0.0009 
Board Diversity           
% Independent -0.1401  -0.0468  0.2296  -0.2356  -0.2669  
Independent (Blau)  0.2081  0.0205  -0.1062  0.2228  0.2467 
% Female 0.1721  0.0727  0.0291a  0.1007  0.1022  
Gender (Blau)  0.1398  0.0423  0.0129  0.0687  0.0706 
Other Directorship 0.1216 0.1259 0.0558 0.0566 0.0145 0.0156 0.0094 0.0117 0.0359 0.0384 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.2755 0.2659 0.1842 0.1894 0.1314 0.1114 0.3928c 0.3939c 0.4157c 0.4181c 
Tenure Diver.(CV) 0.1694 0.1623 0.1849b 0.1862b 0.1555 0.154 0.0106 0.0058 0.0451c 0.0402b 
Industry Diver. -0.4613 -0.4599 -0.0796 -0.0869 -0.2752 -0.259 0.1718 0.1661 0.1111 0.1038 
Ownership Diver. -0.0171 -0.016 0.0019 0.0001 0.0666 0.0695 -0.0392 -0.0392 -0.0332 -0.0336 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) -0.1223c -0.1204c -0.0877b -0.0882c -0.0431c -0.0418b -0.0679c -0.0667c -0.0622c -0.0609c 
Ln (Fund Size) 0.0208a 0.0211a 0.029 0.0286 0.0239 0.0248 0.0214c 0.0213c 0.0216b 0.0215b 
Gross Expense  0.0624 0.0616 0.0614 0.0614 0.0948 0.0956 0.0281 0.0272 0.0268 0.0258 
100aTurnover -0.0644b -0.0633b -0.0777b -0.0778b -0.0633b -0.0633b -0.0044 -0.0038 0.0005 0.0011 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0418 0.0391         
Prev. (FF3)   -0.2413b -0.2399b       
Prev. (FF4)     -0.1283a -0.1313a     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.294c -0.294c   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.4114b -0.4124c 
Adjusted R2 0.0673 0.0692 0.1291 0.1289 0.1128 0.1103 0.1409 0.1422 0.2010 0.2023 
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Panel B: 2011 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average           
Board Size 0.0035 0.0043 0.0031 0.0037 0.0033 0.0038 0.0028a 0.0036a 0.0033b 0.004b 
Chairman  -0.0251 -0.0241 -0.0269 -0.0255 -0.0318 -0.0311 0.0004 -0.0054 -0.0128 -0.0188 
Age -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0031 -0.003 -0.0026b -0.0027c -0.002 -0.0021 
Tenure 0.0072 0.0071 0.008 0.0079 0.0077 0.0076 0.0032a 0.0036a 0.0036 0.004 
100aFunds overseen 0.103c 0.1018c 0.0763c 0.0755c 0.0594b 0.0585b 0.0347b 0.0314b 0.0335a 0.0303 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0057 -0.0053 -0.0011 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0011 0.0085a 0.0073 0.0036 0.0025 
Ln (Ownership) -0.0051 -0.005 -0.005 -0.0048 -0.0036 -0.0035 -0.0056 -0.0051 -0.0047 -0.0042 
# of Committees -0.0244 -0.0244 -0.028a -0.028a -0.0246a -0.0246a -0.0132 -0.0134 -0.0134 -0.0137 
Ave. Meetings 0.003b 0.0029a 0.0024c 0.0024b 0.003b 0.0029a 0.0018c 0.0017c 0.0021c 0.002c 
Board Diversity           
% Independent 0.2506  0.2054  0.1178  -0.0191  0.0016  
Independent (Blau)  -0.2123  -0.1673  -0.0996  -0.0716  -0.0877 
% Female -0.0459  -0.0065  -0.0351  -0.0543  -0.0446  
Gender (Blau)  -0.05  -0.0198  -0.0384  -0.0528  -0.0379 
Other Directorship 0.0309 0.0273 0.0204 0.0169 0.0228 0.0211 0.0134 0.0162 0.0177 0.0203 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.1969 0.1849 0.3573 0.3449 0.2215 0.2137 0.0609 0.0907 0.0803 0.1113 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.1662 -0.1665 -0.1794 -0.1796 -0.1873 -0.1864 -0.0586 -0.0557 -0.0654 -0.0641 
Industry Diver. 0.5588 0.5648 0.6552 0.6628 0.6247 0.6285 0.4491b 0.4418b 0.4895b 0.48b 
Ownership Diver. 0.1012 0.0985 0.0434 0.0416 0.0236 0.0222 -0.0363 -0.039a -0.0435a -0.0457a 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0628a 0.0608a 0.0375 0.0359 0.0183 0.0175 -0.0039 -0.0062 -0.0002 -0.0027 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.02 -0.02 -0.0208 -0.0208 -0.016 -0.0159 -0.0087b -0.0083b -0.0075 -0.0073 
Gross Expense  -0.1828b -0.1807b -0.168c -0.1665c -0.1542c -0.153c -0.0901b -0.0885b -0.0994b -0.0979b 
100aTurnover -0.1489a -0.1481a -0.1304b -0.1299b -0.1237b -0.1232b -0.0462a -0.0452 -0.0481 -0.0472 
Prev. (CAPM) -0.0663 -0.0641         
Prev. (FF3)   0.0463 0.0482       
Prev. (FF4)     0.1137 0.1156     
Prev. (DWA)       0.0896 0.0885   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.0864 0.0858 
Adjusted R2 0.2236 0.2234 0.2203 0.2198 0.2393 0.2394 0.1638 0.1651 0.1689 0.1704 
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Panel C: 2013 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average           
Board Size 0.0169c 0.0141c 0.0094c 0.0066b 0.0095c 0.0068b 0.0093a 0.0075 0.0099a 0.0081 
Chairman  -0.0278 -0.0216 -0.0286 -0.0253 -0.0277 -0.0244 -0.0333 -0.0318 -0.0355 -0.0341 
Age 0.0045 0.0047 0.0027 0.0029 0.0027 0.003 0.0028 0.0027 0.0022 0.0022 
Tenure 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0017 0.002b 0.0019b 0.0024b 0.0023b 
100aFunds overseen 0.0497 0.0574 0.0111 0.0177 0.0097 0.0163 -0.0183 -0.0138 -0.0277 -0.0234 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0012 0.0005 0.0088 0.01 0.0089 0.0101 0.0111 0.0112 0.0114 0.0118 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0215b 0.0219b 0.0206a 0.021a 0.0205a 0.0209a 0.0112 0.0117a 0.0112 0.0116 
# of Committees 0.0026 0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0037 0.006a 0.0059a 0.0058b 0.0056b 
Ave. Meetings 0.0011 0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0019 0.001 0.0007 0.0004 0.0002 
Board Diversity           
% Independent 0.1544b  0.1179a  0.1233a  -0.0207  0.0363  
Independent (Blau)  -0.0584  -0.0563  -0.0613  0.0317  -0.0142 
% Female 0.3939b  0.4058b  0.41b  0.3212b  0.3165b  
Gender (Blau)  0.3452c  0.3703b  0.3703b  0.2612c  0.2673c 
Other Directorship 0.0351 0.0333 0.0189 0.0177 0.0216 0.0201 -0.0244 -0.0243 -0.0223 -0.023 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.2219c 0.2163c 0.1583 0.1576 0.1652 0.1636 0.2081 0.2153 0.1818 0.1866 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.1322 -0.1343 -0.0937 -0.0974 -0.0983 -0.1017 -0.0227 -0.0233 -0.0195 -0.0209 
Industry Diver. -0.4709 -0.4715 -0.3338 -0.3451 -0.3497 -0.3599 -0.13b -0.1322b -0.152 -0.1555 
Ownership Diver. -0.1908b -0.1907a -0.1318a -0.1309a -0.1327a -0.132a -0.025a -0.0277b 0.0294 -0.0306a 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0167 0.0188 -0.0019 0 0.0004 0.0025 -0.0152 -0.0122 -0.0189 -0.0167 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.0067 -0.0086 -0.0065 -0.0086 -0.0082 -0.0103 -0.0017 -0.0027 0.0011 -0.0001 
Gross Expense  -0.181a -0.1832a -0.1372 -0.1399 -0.1439 -0.1467 -0.0729b -0.0771b -0.064a -0.0675a 
100aTurnover -0.0202 -0.022 -0.0235 -0.0252 -0.0236 -0.0252a 0.0358c 0.0348 c 0.0369c 0.0358c 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.2793b 0.2826b         
Prev. (FF3)   0.1212 0.1243       
Prev. (FF4)     0.1279 0.1306     
Prev. (DWA)       0.2662c 0.2613c   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.2279b 0.2232b 





Table 12. Summarized results for fund-family-level cross-sectional regressions with not clustered standard errors 
This table reports summarized results for cross-sectional regressions at the fund-family level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard errors are not 
clustered.  Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple percentages and then 
using Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. The result is ten regression estimates for all the independent variables with the 
exception of independence and gender diversity that only have five regression estimates each for each of their two measures. Coefficient estimates with 
consistently significant positive and negative signs are indicated by + and -, respectively, in the column labelled “Result sign”. Significant coefficient estimates 
with a mixture of signs are indicated by a yellow-highlighted blank cell in the same column for each cross-section. The remaining columns for each cross-section 































Panel A: Average 
Board Size +  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Chairman +  0 0 0 - 0 1 2  0 0 0 
Age - - 0 4 4  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Tenure + + 1 7 8 + 0 3 6  0 0 0 
Funds Overseen +  0 0 0  0 0 0 + 0 2 3 
Ln (Compensation) -  0 0 0  0 0 0 + 0 1 1 
Ln (Ownership) + + 0 2 4  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Committees +  0 0 0 - 0 2 4  0 0 0 
Committee Meeting +  0 0 0 + 0 4 6  0 0 0 
Panel B: Diversity 
% Independent +  0 0 0 + 5 5 5  0 0 0 
Independent (Blau) +  0 0 0 + 2 4 4  0 0 0 
% Female -  0 0 0  0 0 0 + 0 1 2 
Gender (Blau) -  0 0 0  0 0 0 + 0 2 4 
Other Directorship + + 0 2 2  0 0 0 + 0 0 2 
Age (CV) -  0 0 0 + 2 4 5  0 0 0 
Tenure (CV) +  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Occupation + - 0 2 4 + 2 2 2 - 0 0 1 
Ownership -  0 0 0 - 0 0 1  0 0 0 
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Appendix F.  Full results for fund-family-level cross-sectional regressions with no clustered standard errors 
The tables in this appendix report results for each cross-sectional regression at the fund-family level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard errors 
are not clustered.  Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple percentages and 
then using Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. Panel A presents regression results for the sample of 329 fund families in 
2009, Panel B presents regression results for the sample of 323 fund families in 2011, and Panel C presents regression results for the sample of 304 fund families 
in 2013. a, b and c refer to significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: 2009 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size -0.0101 -0.0122 0.0211 0.0189 0.022 0.0191 -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0078 -0.0079 
Chairman  0.1104 0.1277 0.0606 0.0805 0.0376 0.0643 -0.0086 -0.0072 0.0028 0.0045 
Age -0.0094 -0.0093 -0.009 -0.0086 -0.0059 -0.0054 -0.0063b -0.0063b -0.0062b -0.0062b 
Tenure 0.0194b 0.0189b 0.0258c 0.0249b 0.0213b 0.0199b 0.0077a 0.0075b 0.0066 0.0065 
100*Funds overseen 0.0628 0.072 0.102 0.109 0.198 0.208 0.0165 0.0173 0.0199 0.021 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0004 0.001 -0.0178 -0.0154 -0.0078 -0.0047 -0.0099 -0.0098 -0.0092 -0.0092 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0362b 0.0363b 0.0275a 0.0272a 0.0125 0.012 0.0103 0.0102 0.011 0.0109 
# of Committees 0.0112 0.0124 0.0142 0.0162 0.0181 0.0207 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0018 
Ave. Meetings 0.0064 0.0066 0.0029 0.0032 0.0025 0.0028 0.0016 0.0017 0.0024 0.0024 
Board Diversity 
% Independent -0.0756  0.3502  0.5007  0.0288  0.001  
Independent (Blau)  0.2721  -0.0572  -0.1071  -0.015  0.0144 
% Female 0.1459  -0.1916  -0.167  0.0234  0.0377  
Gender (Blau)  0.1295  -0.1088  -0.0924  0.0038  0.017 
Other Directorship 0.2436b 0.25b 0.1054 0.112 0.0444 0.0518 0.057 0.0561 0.0768 0.0764 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.0112 -0.0299 -0.1641 -0.2272 -0.279 -0.3648 0.2455 0.2401 0.2399 0.2347 
Tenure Diver.(CV) 0.3022 0.2899 0.0843 0.0783 0.0209 0.0123 0.0602 0.0593 0.081 0.0795 
Industry Diver. -1.1572a -1.1498 -1.1858 -1.1726a -1.5609b -1.5383b -0.0124 -0.0076 -0.0174 -0.0139 
Ownership Diver. -0.0232 -0.0212 0.009 0.0125 0.1822 0.1883 -0.0593 -0.0581 -0.0588 -0.0576 
Control Variables 
Ln (Family Age) -0.1056 -0.0998 -0.0148 -0.0092 0.0483 0.056 -0.0621 -0.0613 -0.0586 -0.0577 
Ln (Family size) 0.0311 0.0328 0.005 0.0068 -0.0091 -0.0065 0.0301b 0.0304c 0.0285c 0.0288b 
Gross Expense  0.0061 0.0063 0.0242b 0.025b 0.0232c 0.0243c 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0019 
100*Turnover -0.0496 -0.0488 -0.0018 -0.0016 0.0417 0.0421 -0.0271 -0.0272 -0.032a -0.032a 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0094 0.0081         
Prev. (FF3)   -0.006 -0.0036       
Prev. (FF4)     0.095a 0.0978a     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.3474c -0.3481c   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.3983c -0.3988c 
Adjusted R2 0.0265 0.0284 0.0199 0.0176 0.0224 0.0178 0.1471 0.1470 0.1880 0.1879 
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Panel B: 2011 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size 0.0076 0.0091 0.0015 0.0015 0.0106 0.0102 0.0049 0.0065 0.0054 0.0072 
Chairman  -0.0724 -0.0548 -0.0678 -0.0504 -0.1408b -0.1326a -0.0416 -0.0419 -0.0482 -0.0482 
Age -0.0038 -0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0018 -0.0037 -0.0015 -0.0034 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0028 
Tenure 0.0112a 0.0097a 0.0133b 0.012a 0.0179b 0.0169b 0.0059 0.0058 0.0065 0.0064 
100*Funds overseen 0.122 0.124 0.0773 0.0826 0.111 0.115 0.042 0.0391 0.0466 0.0436 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0146 -0.0102 -0.0013 0.0037 -0.0027 0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0058 -0.0059 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0011 0.0002 0.0199 0.0197 0.0001 0.0006 0.0009 0.0014 
# of Committees -0.0246 -0.0234 -0.0415a -0.0406a -0.062b -0.0635b -0.0209 -0.0212 -0.022 -0.0223 
Ave. Meetings 0.0069a 0.0068a 0.0041 0.0048 0.001 0.0016 0.0045b 0.0045b 0.0048b 0.0049b 
Board Diversity 
% Independent 0.9453c  1.0473c  1.2809c  0.4629c  0.5209c  
Independent (Blau)  0.6325  0.6926b  0.9298c  0.4395b  0.4863c 
% Female -0.1555  0.1195  -0.161  -0.035  -0.0461  
Gender (Blau)  -0.1728  0.0866  0.0405  -0.0731  -0.0805 
Other Directorship 0.0367 0.0186 0.0292 0.0085 0.0807 0.0648 0.0372 0.0323 0.0432 0.0375 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.8063a 0.7004 1.5411c 1.4495c 1.2378b 1.2072b 0.4043 0.3979 0.3803 0.372 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0455 -0.0476 0.0216 0.0059 -0.0751 -0.1123 0.0394 0.0403 0.037 0.0371 
Industry Diver. 0.5088 0.5491 0.5524 0.5904 1.3739c 1.3521c 0.3301 0.352 0.3398 0.3625 
Ownership Diver. 0.1927 0.1807 0.1323 0.1201 0.1325 0.1072 0.1048 0.1048 -0.1246 -0.124a 
Control Variables 
Ln (Family Age) 0.0721 0.0709 0.0479 0.0451 0.0807 -0.1073 0.0153 0.0103 0.0162 0.0109 
Ln (Family size) -0.0745c -0.0747c -0.0753c -0.0762c 1.2378c -0.0733c -0.0358c -0.0351c -0.0355c -0.0348c 
Gross Expense  -0.388c -0.3827c -0.3148c -0.3106c -0.0751c -0.3772c -0.1595c -0.156c -0.1713c -0.1674c 
100*Turnover -0.159c -0.158c -0.123c -0.123c 1.3739c -0.213c -0.0647c -0.0641c -0.0717c -0.0711c 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0846 0.0941   0.1325      
Prev. (FF3)   0.1467a 0.1611b       
Prev. (FF4)     0.0236 0.0394     
Prev. (DWA)       0.0512 0.0546   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.0473 0.0517 
Adjusted R2 0.2294 0.2213 0.1755 0.1624 0.2172 0.2066 0.1157 0.1186 0.1338 0.1363 
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Panel C: 2013 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
 % Blau % Blau  % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average  
Board Size -0.0022 -0.0056 -0.0022 -0.005 -0.0059 -0.008 0.012 0.0097 0.0113 0.0088 
Chairman  -0.0275 -0.0179 -0.0243 -0.0246 -0.0204 -0.0253 -0.0393 -0.0309 -0.0436 -0.0354 
Age -0.0054 -0.0048 -0.0032 -0.0027 -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0006 
Tenure 0.0022 0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0024 -0.0036 -0.0036 0.0035 0.0035 0.0041 0.0039 
100*Funds overseen 0.0188 0.0311 -0.0273 -0.0218 -0.0156 -0.0137 0.116 0.107a 0.121b 0.111b 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0042 0.0066 -0.0081 -0.0074 -0.01 -0.0099 0.0074b 0.0088 0.0053 0.0071 
Ln (Ownership) -0.0125 -0.0128 -0.0137 -0.0139 -0.0145 -0.0144 -0.0096 -0.0101 -0.009 -0.0095 
# of Committees 0.0007 0.0006 0.0078 0.0073 0.0038 0.0031 0.0197 0.0198 0.0192 0.0192 
Ave. Meetings 0.002 0.0017 -0.0031 -0.0035 -0.0028 -0.0031 0.0032 0.0029 0.0025 0.0023 
Board Diversity 
% Independent 0.0755  0.082  0.0855  0.01  0.0497  
Independent (Blau)  0.0692  -0.0525  -0.1048  0.107  0.056 
% Female 0.2244  0.3113  0.2332  0.2366a  0.2703b  
Gender (Blau)  0.2777a  0.3454a  0.2904  0.2149b  0.2515b 
Other Directorship 0.0917 0.0957 0.1301 0.1306 0.1091 0.1091 0.0981a 0.0952a -0.0872 -0.0852 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.3927 0.4074 0.1409 0.1584 0.2287 0.2522 -0.2287 -0.2302 -0.1926 -0.192 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.0611 -0.0672 -0.0687 -0.0755 -0.0588 -0.0666 -0.017 -0.0186 -0.015 -0.0176 
Industry Diver. -0.3406 -0.3508 -0.794a -0.8254 -0.4777 -0.52 -0.0056 0.0018 -0.1148 -0.1077 
Ownership Diver. 0.0912 0.0894 0.0745 0.0694 0.0447 0.0377 -0.0693 -0.0668 -0.0714 -0.0703 
Control Variables 
Ln (Family Age) 0.0113 0.0111 0.0061 0.006 0.0086 0.0073 -0.0005 0.0015 -0.0125 -0.011 
Ln (Family size) 0.0598c 0.0575c 0.057b 0.0547b 0.0656c 0.0635c 0.0024 0.0014 0.0087 0.0074 
Gross Expense  0.1653c 0.1636c 0.1869c 0.1864c 0.1744c 0.1753c -0.0182 -0.0213 0.0029 0.0002 
100*Turnover -0.0511 -0.0543 -0.0896b -0.0915b -0.0825b -0.0838b 0.0709c 0.0687c 0.0688c 0.0665c 
Prev. (CAPM) -0.169b -0.1675b         
Prev. (FF3)   -0.0558 -0.0541       
Prev. (FF4)     -0.216c -0.2137c     
Prev. (DWA)       0.4313c 0.4265c   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.4163c 0.409c 






Table 13. Summarized results for fund-family-level cross-sectional regressions with not clustered standard errors for the robustness test sample 
This table reports summarized results for cross-sectional regressions for the smaller samples at the fund level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the standard 
errors are not clustered.  To be included in these smaller samples, each fund share class is required to have at least 48-month consecutive returns and NAVs. 
Separate cross-sectional regressions are conducted for each of the five different fund performance measures using first simple percentages and then using Blau’s 
diversity index as the independence and gender diversity measures. The result is ten regression estimates for all the independent variables with the exception of 
independence and gender diversity that only have five regression estimates each for each of their two measures. Coefficient estimates with consistently 
significant positive and negative signs are indicated by + and -, respectively, in the column labelled “Result sign”. Significant coefficient estimates with a 
mixture of signs are indicated by a yellow-highlighted blank cell in the same column for each cross-section. The remaining columns for each cross-section 
represent the number of significant coefficients at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. The family-level sample size for the robustness test sample is 294, 308 and 299 






Sample 2009 Sample 2011 Sample 2013 
Result 
Sign 
#  at  
1% 
#  at  
5% 




#  at  
1% 
#  at  
5% 




#  at  
1% 
#  at  
5% 
#  at  
10% 
Panel A: Average 
Board Size +   0 0 0   0 0 0 + 0 0 1 
Chairman +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Age -   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Tenure + + 0 0 1 + 0 1 4   0 0 0 
Funds Overseen +   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Ln (Compensation) -   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Ln (Ownership) + + 0 0 2   0 0 0 + 2 10 10 
Committees +   0 0 0 - 0 3 4   0 0 0 
Committee Meeting +   0 0 0 + 1 6 9   0 0 0 
Panel B: Diversity 
% Independent + + 0 0 2   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Independent (Blau) + + 0 1 2   0 0 0   0 0 0 
% Female -   0 0 0   0 0 0 + 4 4 4 
Gender (Blau) -   0 0 0   0 0 0 + 5 5 5 
Other Directorship +   0 0 0   0 0 0 + 1 1 1 
Age (CV) -   0 0 0   0 0 0   0 0 0 
Tenure (CV) +   0 0 0 - 0 1 4 - 0 0 3 
Occupation +   0 0 0 + 0 4 8 - 0 0 2 
Ownership -   0 0 0   0 0 0 - 2 6 6 
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Appendix G. Full results for fund-family-level cross-sectional regressions with no clustered standard errors for the robustness test samples 
The tables in this appendix report results for each cross-sectional regression for the smaller sample at the fund-family level for each of 2009, 2011 and 2013 where the 
standard errors are not clustered. To be included, each fund share class is required to have at least 48-month consecutive returns and NAVs. Separate cross-sectional 
regressions are conducted for the five fund performance measures using simple percentages and then Blau’s diversity index as the independence and gender diversity 
measures. The sample consists of 294 fund families in Panel A, 308 fund families in Panel B, and 299 fund families in Panel C. a, b and c refer to significance at the 0.10, 
0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
Panel A: 2009 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average           
Board Size -0.0111 -0.0124 -0.0022 -0.0021 0.0013 0.0004 -0.0059 -0.0062 -0.0085 -0.0087 
Chairman  0.079 0.086 0.0593 0.0572 0.0375 0.0443 -0.0023 0.0002 0.0128 0.015 
Age -0.003 -0.0029 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0013 -0.0014 
Tenure 0.0102 0.0101 0.0051 0.0053 0.0035 0.0029 0.0064 0.0065a 0.0052 0.0054 
100aFunds overseen 0.0145 0.0179 -0.0027 -0.0033 0.0747 0.0749 0.0067 0.0097 0.0092 0.0124 
Ln (Compensation) 0.0087 0.0091 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0052 -0.0037 0.0107 0.0102 0.0119 0.0113 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0205a 0.021a 0.0111 0.0111 0.0052 0.005 0.0064 0.0068 0.006 0.0064 
# of Committees 0.008 0.0088 0.0164 0.0163 0.0111 0.0121 0.0022 0.0021 0.0018 0.0017 
Ave. Meetings 0.0024 0.0025 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0009 0.0009 
Board Diversity           
% Independent 0.1401  0.0468  0.2296  0.2356a  0.2669a  
Independent (Blau)  0.2081  0.0205  -0.1062  0.2228a  0.2467b 
% Female 0.1721  -0.0727  -0.0291  0.1007  0.1022  
Gender (Blau)  0.1398  -0.0423  -0.0129  0.0687  0.0706 
Other Directorship 0.1216 0.1259 0.0558 0.0566 0.0145 0.0156 0.0094 0.0117 0.0359 0.0384 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.2755 0.2659 0.1842 0.1894 0.1314 0.1114 0.3928 0.3939 0.4157 0.4181 
Tenure Diver.(CV) 0.1694 0.1623 0.1849 0.1862 0.1555 0.154 0.0106 0.0058 0.0451 0.0402 
Industry Diver. -0.4613 -0.4599 -0.0796 -0.0869 -0.2752 -0.259 0.1718 0.1661 0.1111 0.1038 
Ownership Diver. -0.0171 -0.016 0.0019 0.0001 0.0666 0.0695 -0.0392 -0.0392 -0.0332 -0.0321 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) -0.1223b -0.1204b -0.0877 -0.0882 -0.0431 -0.0418 -0.0679b -0.0667a -0.0622a -0.0336a 
Ln (Fund Size) 0.0208 0.0211 0.029a 0.0286a 0.0239 0.0248a 0.0214a 0.0213a 0.0216b -0.0609b 
Gross Expense  0.0624a 0.0616a 0.0614a 0.0614a 0.0948a 0.0956a 0.0281 0.0272 0.0268 0.0215 
100aTurnover -0.0644 -0.0633 -0.0777a -0.0778a -0.0633a -0.0633a -0.0044 -0.0038 0.0005 0.0258 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.0418 0.0391        0.0011 
Prev. (FF3)   -0.2413c -0.2399c       
Prev. (FF4)     -0.1283 -0.1313a     
Prev. (DWA)       -0.294c -0.294c   
Prev. (TWA)                 -0.4114c -0.4124c 
Adjusted R2 0.0673 0.0692 0.1291 0.1289 0.1128 0.1103 0.1409 0.1422 0.2010 0.2023 
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Appendix G. Cont’d 
Panel B: 2011 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average           
Board Size 0.0035 0.0043 0.0031 0.0037 0.0033 0.0038 0.0028 0.0036 0.0033 0.004 
Chairman  -0.0251 -0.0241 -0.0269 -0.0255 -0.0318 -0.0311 0.0004 -0.0054 -0.0128 -0.0188 
Age -0.0029 -0.0026 -0.0024 -0.0022 -0.0031 -0.003 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.002 -0.0021 
Tenure 0.0072 0.0071 0.008a 0.0079a 0.0077b 0.0076a 0.0032 0.0036 0.0036 0.004 
100aFunds overseen 0.103 0.1018 0.0763 0.0755 0.0594 0.0585 0.0347 0.0314 0.0335 0.0303 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0057 -0.0053 -0.0011 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0011 0.0085 0.0073 0.0036 0.0025 
Ln (Ownership) -0.0051 -0.005 -0.005 -0.0048 -0.0036 -0.0035 -0.0056 -0.0051 -0.0047 -0.0042 
# of Committees -0.0244 -0.0244 -0.028b -0.028b -0.0246b -0.0246a -0.0132 -0.0134 -0.0134 -0.0137 
Ave. Meetings 0.003 0.0029b 0.0024a 0.0024a 0.003b 0.0029b 0.0018b 0.0017a 0.0021c 0.002b 
Board Diversity           
% Independent 0.2506  0.2054  0.1178  -0.0191  0.0016  
Independent (Blau)  -0.2123  -0.1673  -0.0996  -0.0716  -0.0877 
% Female -0.0459  -0.0065  -0.0351  -0.0543  -0.0446  
Gender (Blau)  -0.05  -0.0198  -0.0384  -0.0528  -0.0379 
Other Directorship 0.0309 0.0273 0.0204 0.0169 0.0228 0.0211 0.0134 0.0162 0.0177 0.0203 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.1969 0.1849 0.3573 0.3449 0.2215 0.2137 0.0609 0.0907 0.0803 0.1113 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.1662 -0.1665 -0.1794a -0.1796a -0.1873b -0.1864a -0.0586 -0.0557 -0.0654 -0.0641 
Industry Diver. 0.5588 0.5648 0.6552a 0.6628a 0.6247a 0.6285a 0.4491b 0.4418b 0.4895b 0.48b 
Ownership Diver. 0.1012 0.0985 0.0434 0.0416 0.0236 0.0222 0.0363 0.039 0.0435 0.0457 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0628 0.0608 0.0375 0.0359 0.0183 0.0175 -0.0039 -0.0062 -0.0002 -0.0027 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.02 -0.02 -0.0208 -0.0208 -0.016 -0.0159 -0.0087 -0.0083 -0.0075 -0.0073 
Gross Expense  -0.1828c -0.1807c -0.168c -0.1665c -0.1542c -0.153c -0.0901c -0.0885c -0.0994c -0.0979c 
100aTurnover -0.1489c -0.1481c -0.1304c -0.1299c -0.1237c -0.1232c -0.0462b -0.0452b -0.0481c -0.0472c 
Prev. (CAPM) -0.0663 -0.0641         
Prev. (FF3)   0.0463 0.0482       
Prev. (FF4)     0.1137b 0.1156b     
Prev. (DWA)       0.0896a 0.0885a   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.0864a 0.0858a 
Adjusted R2 0.2236 0.2234 0.2203 0.2198 0.2393 0.2394 0.1638 0.1651 0.1689 0.1704 
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Appendix G. Cont’d 
Panel C: 2013 Sample 
CAPM FF3 FF4 DWA TWA 
% Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau % Blau 
Average           
Board Size 0.0169 0.0141 0.0094 0.0066 0.0095 0.0068 0.0093 0.0075 0.0099a 0.0081 
Chairman  -0.0278 -0.0216 -0.0286 -0.0253 -0.0277 -0.0244 -0.0333 -0.0318 -0.0355 -0.0341 
Age 0.0045 0.0047 0.0027 0.0029 0.0027 0.003 0.0028 0.0027 0.0022 0.0022 
Tenure 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0017 0.002 0.0019 0.0024 0.0023 
100aFunds overseen 0.0497 0.0574 0.0111 0.0177 0.0097 0.0163 -0.0183 -0.0138 -0.0277 -0.0234 
Ln (Compensation) -0.0012 0.0005 0.0088 0.01 0.0089 0.0101 0.0111 0.0112 0.0114 0.0118 
Ln (Ownership) 0.0215c 0.0219c 0.0206b 0.021b 0.0205b 0.0209b 0.0112b 0.0117b 0.0112b 0.0116b 
# of Committees 0.0026 0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0037 0.006 0.0059 0.0058 0.0056 
Ave. Meetings 0.0011 0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0019 0.001 0.0007 0.0004 0.0002 
Board Diversity           
% Independent 0.1544  0.1179  0.1233  -0.0207  0.0363  
Independent (Blau)  -0.0584  -0.0563  -0.0613  0.0317  -0.0142 
% Female 0.3939c  0.4058c  0.41c  0.3212c  0.3165  
Gender (Blau)  0.3452c  0.3703c  0.3703c  0.2612c  0.2673c 
Other Directorship 0.0351 0.0333 0.0189 0.0177 0.0216 0.0201 0.0244 0.0243 0.0223c 0.023 
Age Diver.(CV) 0.2219 0.2163 0.1583 0.1576 0.1652 0.1636 -0.2081 -0.2153 -0.1818 -0.1866 
Tenure Diver.(CV) -0.1322a -0.1343a -0.0937 -0.0974 -0.0983 -0.1017a -0.0227 -0.0233 -0.0195 -0.0209 
Industry Diver. -0.4709a -0.4715a -0.3338 -0.3451 -0.3497 -0.3599 -0.13 -0.1322 -0.152 -0.1555 
Ownership Diver. -0.1908c -0.1907c -0.1318b -0.1309b -0.1327b -0.132b 0.025 0.0277 0.0294 0.0306 
Control Variables           
Ln (Fund Age) 0.0167 0.0188 -0.0019 0 0.0004 0.0025 -0.0152 -0.0122 -0.0189 -0.0167 
Ln (Fund Size) -0.0067 -0.0086 -0.0065 -0.0086 -0.0082 -0.0103 -0.0017 -0.0027 0.0011 -0.0001 
Gross Expense  -0.181b -0.1832 -0.1372b -0.1399 -0.1439b -0.1467b -0.0729c -0.0771c -0.064c -0.0675c 
100aTurnover -0.0202 -0.022b -0.0235 -0.0252b -0.0236 -0.0252 0.0358b 0.0348b 0.0369c 0.0358b 
Prev. (CAPM) 0.2793c 0.2826c         
Prev. (FF3)   0.1212 0.1243       
Prev. (FF4)     0.1279 0.1306     
Prev. (DWA)       0.2662c 0.2613c   
Prev. (TWA)                 0.2279c 0.2232c 
Adjusted R2 0.2962 0.2979 0.1885 0.1950 0.1905 0.1963 0.2299 0.2294 0.2059 0.2081 
 
 
